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Absolute Conflicts of Law 
ANTHONY J. COLANGELO* 
A man who is habitually punished for doing what he was ordered to do can hardly be 
expected to respond appropriately to orders given him in the future. If our treatment of him 
is part of an attempt to build up a system of rules for the governance of his conduct, then we 
shall fail in that attempt. On the other hand if our object is to cause him to have a nervous 
breakdown, we may succeed. 
– Lon L. Fuller1 
Hello, Dave. I think we may be on to an explanation of the trouble with the Hal 9000 
computer. . . . We believe his truth programming and the instructions to lie, gradually 
resulted in an incompatible conflict, and faced with this dilemma, he developed, for want of 
a better description, neurotic symptoms. 
– Stanley Kubrick & Arthur C. Clark2 
This Article coins the term “absolute conflicts of law” to describe situations of 
overlapping laws from different states that contain simultaneous contradictory 
commands. It argues that absolute conflicts are a unique legal phenomenon in need 
of a unique doctrine. The Article extensively explores what absolute conflicts are; 
how they qualitatively differ from other doctrines like true conflicts of law, act of 
state, and comity; and classifies absolute conflicts’ myriad doctrinal manifestations 
through a taxonomy that categorizes absolute conflicts as procedural, substantive, 
mixed, horizontal, and vertical. 
The Article then proposes solutions to absolute conflicts that center on the rule of 
law and fairness to parties—solutions that are in methodological tension with 
prevailing tests that preference largely, if not exclusively, state interests. The fairness 
test the Article advances pulls from considerations courts have been quietly 
developing over the past few decades and reorients absolute conflict analysis around 
these considerations. It concludes by showing that a fairness test generates better 
outcomes for parties, states, and the international legal system generally, not only 
by better conforming to the rule of law but also by better facilitating transnational 
activity beneficent to overall welfare. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Most of us would probably consider a contradictory law a pretty bad law, let alone 
a legitimate “law” in the first place—for the simple reason that such a law is 
impossible to comply with. Imagine a law commanding people to sit and stand at the 
same time: not only would that law never be obeyed, its very existence would 
undermine the basic idea of “law.” Yet this sort of thing happens with increasing 
frequency in the present international system of concurrent regulatory regimes. Take 
for example a U.S. discovery order to disclose information protected by foreign 
privacy law,3 an antitrust law commanding domestic businesses operating abroad to 
violate the laws of the countries where they are operating,4 an antiterrorism law 
compelling foreign banks to violate their home country’s bank secrecy laws,5 or an 
antidiscrimination law prohibiting a certain type of discrimination in a country whose 
laws require that very discrimination.6 The list goes on. 
To coin a term, this Article calls these situations “absolute conflicts of law,” and 
seeks to identify them as their own unique legal phenomenon in need of its own 
unique doctrine. The Article distinguishes absolute conflicts from other doctrines 
that tend to subsume or blend into them, like so-called true conflicts of law, act of 
state, and comity. And it sets out to explain the conceptual contours, doctrinal 
manifestations, and huge practical implications of absolute conflicts for a rapidly 
shrinking world in which transnational actors are increasingly subject to multiple 
contradictory regulatory regimes. The Article then advances a theory of absolute 
conflicts rooted in fairness to parties that is at odds with prevailing analyses of these 
situations—analyses weighted heavily, if not exclusively, toward state interests. I 
argue that an approach based primarily on fairness to parties instead of state interests 
promises not only to bring coherence to this area of law but also to furnish good 
practical results for states, parties, and the international system generally by fostering 
transnational activity beneficent to overall welfare like trade, travel, and 
communication. 
As the absolute conflicts listed above suggest, they come in various flavors: they 
may be conflicts of substantive law, or what we might call “substantive absolute 
conflicts”; conflicts of procedural law, or “procedural absolute conflicts”; or, quite 
often, conflicts involving both substantive and procedural law, or “mixed absolute 
conflicts.” How best to resolve a particular absolute conflict may turn deeply on the 
type of conflict at issue—that is, whether it is substantive, procedural, or a mix of 
both. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 4. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.  
 5. See infra note 74 and accompanying text  
 6. See infra notes 64, 80 and accompanying text. 
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Moreover, all of the conflicts mentioned so far are but one species of absolute 
conflict—what I will refer to as “horizontal absolute conflicts,” or conflicts between 
coequal states’ laws.7 But there also may exist “vertical absolute conflicts” between 
a state’s law and a purportedly supranational law, like international law. Here I say 
purportedly supranational because whether international law is “above” national law 
in the sense of trumping it the way U.S. federal law is above U.S. state law is an 
exceedingly complex question, and one that will be addressed in more detail below.8 
Of initial interest, however, is that because international law is overwhelmingly 
enforced via national legislative and judicial apparatuses, states may claim (or try to 
claim) the power of vertical enforcement in horizontal absolute conflicts. That is, by 
incorporating international law into national law, states may try to enlist international 
law to argue that their laws necessarily win absolute conflicts with other states’ laws 
by virtue of acting as the enforcement mechanism of international law; to wit, our 
national law enforcing the international law against financing terrorism beats your 
national law protecting financial institutions alleged to have financed terrorism.9  
The Article’s core thesis is that absolute conflicts are qualitatively different from 
what are conventionally referred to as “true conflicts of law” in conflict of laws 
parlance—that is, situations in which one state’s law prohibits or imposes liability 
for what another state’s law merely permits (but does not require).10 As a result, I 
argue that absolute conflicts demand qualitatively different analyses. Specifically, 
while prevailing conflict of laws analysis focuses principally if not exclusively on 
state interests, or what might be thought of as competing claims of state sovereignty, 
absolute conflict analysis instead should focus principally on fairness to parties 
subject to contradictory laws. 
In this regard, I use as my theoretical anchor the idea of the rule of law, or “the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.”11 As the 
contradictory law hypothesized at the outset illustrates, at the heart of every rule of 
law criterion tends to be the rudimentary requirement that legal actors can fairly 
comply with the law. This is why a law commanding people to sit and stand at the 
same time does not conform to the rule of law: it is impossible to obey. Not only will 
a contradictory law thus fail to perform law’s essential task of shaping human 
behavior, it also calls into question the entire enterprise of law as a set of rules that 
can and should shape human behavior.12 This same basic reasoning applies to other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 7. I would include here conflicts between a subnational sovereign unit like a U.S. state 
and a foreign nation. See, e.g., McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1419 (9th Cir. 
1989) (addressing the possibility of conflict between California and Saudi Arabia law). 
 8. See infra Part I.B.5. 
 9. See infra Parts I.B.4–5, which discuss how horizontal and vertical conflict dynamics 
open up possibilities of what are called “apparent conflicts” among laws. With horizontal 
absolute conflicts, if different sets of laws advance the same fundamental policy, even if the 
laws themselves superficially conflict, there is an apparent conflict and that underlying policy 
prevails. And more contentiously, with vertical absolute conflicts, because international law 
may trump national law in some instances, no legal conflict can exist with domestic law. See 
infra Part I.B.5. 
 10. See infra Part I.A.1.  
  11. FULLER, supra note 1, at 106. 
 12. In addition to undermining rule of law criteria and the beneficial implications of 
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rule of law criteria as well. Hence rule of law criteria like publicity, prospectivity, 
and intelligibility.13 What use would law be if it were a secret (publicity), if it came 
into being only after people acted (prospectivity), or if it were written in gibberish 
(intelligibility)? At bottom, the rule of law aims to allow legal actors to plan their 
activities and to act in compliance with the law; in the end, it is about being able to 
predict how law will treat your activity.14 
These values extend in mounting and important ways to the international system 
that has seen dramatic increases in international travel, communication, and 
commerce, with transnational actors like multinational corporations now regularly 
doing business in many states. The more transnational actors are able to predict how 
law, broadly conceived, will treat their behavior, the more they will be able to comply 
with the law. And this enhanced predictability in turn will promote more and more 
activity that otherwise might be chilled by legal uncertainty—activity generally 
considered beneficent to people, states, and the international system, like trade, 
travel, and communication.15 The salient question absolute conflicts pose is how to 
adapt rule of law fairness and predictability values to contradictory laws emanating 
not from one sovereign but from multiple sovereigns with overlapping or concurrent 
jurisdictions.  
Of course predicate to this question is the antecedent question of whether the rule 
of law can even apply to the international system in the first place; both the literature 
and our legal imaginations tend to conceive of the rule of law as operating within a 
single legal system and, accordingly, rule of law criteria tend to take the form of 
                                                                                                                 
 
upholding those criteria as explicated in this Article, there may be other reasons to disfavor 
absolute conflicts. For instance, the legal concept of absolute conflicts bears some 
correspondence to the psychological concept of a “double bind,” in which “a person is 
confronted with a series of contradictory messages from a powerful or socially significant 
other” from which the person cannot withdraw. PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 223 
(4th ed. 2009). While double binds can be employed in a positive way in structured settings 
(for example, in koans or lessons of Zen Buddhist masters to help students toward 
enlightenment), more often double binds have been theorized to cause distress or “pernicious 
effects on the targeted person,” THE CONCISE CORSINI ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PSYCHOLOGY AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE 299 (W. Edward Craighead & Charles B. Nemeroff eds., 3rd ed. 2004), 
whether in family, cybernetic, or other systems. This rather intuitive conclusion might further 
inform disfavoring absolute conflicts in the law. I am indebted to Lorelei Rowe in the SMU 
Psychology Department for discussing this concept with me. 
 13. See FULLER, supra note 1, at 39. 
 14. As explained later in the Article, see infra notes 293–297 and accompanying text, I 
therefore use the rule of law concept principally to describe those criteria that law strives 
toward so as to fairly and effectively govern human behavior largely without regard to whether 
it also encompasses the substantive morality of particular rules. Nonetheless, and this is a 
paper for another day, I would be amenable to certain domestic constitutional and international 
peremptory or jus cogens norms acting as a species of “side constraint,” see ROBERT NOZICK, 
ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 33–35 (1974), on the disposition of absolute conflicts if the 
proposed methodology were to lead to application of an exceptionally odious law that 
contravenes widely agreed upon fundamental substantive rights—a view that would comport 
with the Article’s discussion of vertical absolute conflicts, see infra Part I.B.5. 
 15. See infra notes 295–296 and accompanying text. 
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directives to some single sovereign or ultimate lawmaking authority.16 Yet the 
international legal system is a singularly exceptional composite of multiple coequal 
national legal systems with no overarching or ultimate lawmaking authority to which 
rule of law directives may be addressed. I engage, and defend, the rule of law’s 
applicability to the international system in the Article’s transition from Part I’s 
descriptive account of absolute conflicts to Part II’s normative analysis of how they 
should be resolved. 
In this connection, the Article’s organization is as follows. Part I seeks to identify 
a distinct doctrine of absolute conflicts of law and describes them across various 
areas to cast them as a trans-substantive phenomenon. A detailed tour of the law will 
be helpful for a couple of reasons. First, until now the law has largely failed not only 
to identify absolute conflicts as such but also has proceeded to address and resolve 
them piecemeal, without a greater understanding of both what they are and the 
enormous legal and practical interests they implicate. At least in U.S. law, confusion 
surrounds their various doctrinal manifestations. For instance, the most prominent 
absolute conflict doctrine in U.S. law is called “foreign sovereign compulsion,” by 
which courts excuse the operation of U.S. law compelling actors to violate foreign 
law abroad.17 But what is the difference between this doctrine and the purported 
separation of powers doctrine called “act of state,” by which courts deem valid 
another sovereign’s public act in its own territory,18 and good old-fashioned 
“comity,” by which courts simply defer to foreign interests?19  
And procedurally, what form should absolute conflicts arguments take? Are they 
merits-based objections to the reach and application of a law, jurisdictional 
objections to a court’s power to hear a case or to subject parties before it to judicial 
process, or arguments about judicial discretion to refuse to entertain certain claims? 
Courts have failed to supply consistent and coherent answers to these questions. Yet 
they are of major significance not only to scholars and practitioners interested in how 
U.S. law treats instances of contradictory overlapping laws but also to transnational 
actors increasingly subject to those contradictory overlapping laws. 
Part I tries to answer these questions in terms of both substantive and procedural 
law. It begins by distinguishing absolute conflicts from related doctrines of true 
conflicts of law, act of state, and comity. It then develops a taxonomy of absolute 
conflicts, classifying them as substantive, procedural, mixed, horizontal, and vertical. 
Along the way, I argue that under current Supreme Court precedent, lower courts 
treating absolute conflicts as questions of judicial subject matter jurisdiction are 
wrong because absolute conflicts more properly go to prescriptive and enforcement 
jurisdiction, or the application and enforcement of the law, and consequently ought 
to be argued on the merits or waived. Not only does this make sense in light of recent 
Supreme Court precedent and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it also brings 
coherence to the broader law of absolute conflicts because courts presently (and 
counterintuitively, in my view) treat absolute conflicts of procedural laws as going 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. See infra notes 298–299 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 19. See infra Part I.A.3. 
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to the merits and absolute conflicts of substantive laws as going to a court’s subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
Despite the doctrinal disarray, however, one common theme emerges so far: the 
law tends to treat absolute conflicts in a manner not dissimilar to true conflicts of 
laws. Prevailing absolute conflict methodologies preference balancing approaches 
that weight most heavily state interests and thus, in practice, marginalize party rights. 
Yet as I will argue, party rights should not only be included: they should hold a 
paramount place in the analysis and resolution of absolute conflicts. This is not to 
say state-focused concepts like sovereignty and comity have no place in absolute 
conflict analysis. Rather, by preferencing party rights in absolute conflict analyses, 
state interests may actually be captured in a more nuanced and accurate way in the 
context of particular cases and furthered in the long run and at the macro level of 
systemic rule of law coherence. Instead of viewing state interests solely as the blind 
advancement of one or another discrete substantive or procedural policy in isolation, 
a fairness approach recasts them as more context sensitive to a particular case. And 
it enhances general fairness and predictability so as to facilitate trade, travel, and 
communication among transnational actors and, in turn, states—thereby increasing 
the fitness of the international system at large. 
Take for instance the most common mixed absolute conflict, if not the most 
common absolute conflict of all: a domestic discovery order to produce information 
protected by foreign privacy law. Prevailing absolute conflict analysis in the United 
States classifies this scenario under the “foreign sovereign compulsion”20 doctrine 
alluded to earlier and described by courts as a situation in which defendants claim 
“[foreign] law requires them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the 
United States, or claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is 
otherwise impossible.”21 One could easily write an entire article on this doctrine. Yet 
it is but one symptom of a larger phenomenon of transnational antinomies that is on 
a sharp upward trajectory in terms of both frequency and importance in the cases. 
To resolve this absolute conflict, the most recent version of the Restatement of 
Foreign Relations Law sets out a balancing approach that considers a number of 
litigation-related factors like the importance of the requested information to the 
proceedings, the specificity of the request, and, most decisively for courts, “the extent 
to which noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of the 
United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests 
of the state where the information is located.”22 A majority of courts follow the 
Restatement, and emphasize the competing state interests before what is often a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 20. See infra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 21. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW §§ 403 cmt. e, 415 cmt. j (1987). It is worth pointing out that the Supreme Court in 
Hartford Fire called this type of situation a “true conflict,” which is in my view clearly wrong 
from a conflict of laws perspective. See Anthony J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to 
Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1042 (2011). The Court also felt that because the 
foreign conduct was permitted but not compelled by foreign law in that case, the foreign 
defendant had failed to meet this threshold. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 798–99. 
 22. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) (1987); see infra Part 
I.B.3.a.ii. 
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perfunctory rehearsal of the other factors.23 Unsurprisingly to students of conflicts of 
law, the forum state’s interests tend to take priority and tilt the absolute conflict in 
favor of forum law—here U.S. law compelling discovery.24  
Indeed, this result is almost predetermined when one considers that, as a mixed 
absolute conflict, courts routinely find not one but two U.S. interests implicated: the 
procedural “concept of full and liberal discovery . . . . [as] a means to achieve a larger 
goal: the just adjudication of civil disputes”25 plus whatever substantive policy is at 
stake—whether it is antiterrorism,26 antitrust,27 antidiscrimination,28 antifraud,29 or 
anticorruption.30 And, if the case involves some form of government enforcement, we 
can be triply sure U.S. law will trump because courts defer to the executive in foreign 
affairs.31 The result, in a broad and pragmatic sense, is a powerful pro-forum bias in a 
vast majority of cases that not only encourages forum shopping but also increases the 
arbitrariness and difficulty of predicting what law will apply to defendants’ conduct 
at the time defendants decide to act by placing the decision of where to initiate 
proceedings—and thus effectively what law likely will govern—outside of 
defendants’ control. A fairness approach, by contrast, promises more consistency 
across jurisdictions and predictability for transnational actors at the crucial moment 
when they decide whether to engage in transnational activity.  
And yet, conspicuously missing from the current Restatement’s balancing 
approach is fairness to parties subject to the absolute conflict of laws (though good 
faith in attempting to comply with the order does factor in at the sanctions stage32). 
As I will explain, a previous version of the Restatement included party interests like 
the hardship parties would face as a result of complying with U.S. law,33 and a 
number of courts have added their own fairness factors to the calculus, including, 
most notably, the hardship factor, good faith, the party or nonparty status of the 
person or entity subject to the absolute conflict, and the fairness inherent in bearing 
burdens reciprocal to the benefits that attend a degree of U.S. presence, whether 
business or otherwise.34 Implicit and sometimes explicit in the last consideration is 
whether the party could have anticipated, or was fairly on notice, that it would be 
subject to the U.S. law in question.35 I will argue that these types of fairness factors 
should be the touchstone of absolute conflict of laws analysis and that such an 
approach is more faithful to the Supreme Court decision that originated the foreign 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See infra Part I.B.3.a.ii. 
 24. See infra notes 51–52, 209–214 and accompanying text.  
 25. Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 549 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 26. See infra note 75. And the substantive argument is further strengthened where foreign 
substantive law has the same underlying policy as the U.S. law. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 27. See infra note 76.  
 28. See infra note 80.  
 29. See infra note 77. 
 30. See infra note 78. 
 31. See infra Part I.B.4. Some courts have even extended a degree of deference to private 
suits that enforce public norms. See infra Part I.B.5.c. 
 32. See infra Part I.B.3.a.ii. 
 33. See infra Part I.B.3.a.i. 
 34. See infra Part I.B.3.a.i; see also infra Part II. 
 35. See infra Part II.B.1.a.iii. 
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sovereign compulsion doctrine, Societe Internationale v. Rogers,36 than the current 
balancing approaches.  
Accordingly, after describing the law of absolute conflicts in Part I, Part II 
develops rule of law criteria for resolving them. Two key fairness criteria that grow 
out of Rogers anchor the analysis: good faith and the hardship parties likely will face 
as a result of the absolute conflict. I break down each of these criteria to explain their 
constituent elements and the law governing those elements, and suggest that in 
addition to preferencing fairness and predictability for transnational actors, they may 
actually provide a more nuanced and accurate picture of state interests than 
prevailing interest methodologies themselves given the fairness approach’s 
context-sensitive nature. Good faith comprises not courting absolute conflicts, efforts 
to comply with contradictory laws, and not purposefully hiding behind foreign law 
to avoid U.S. law. Hardship cuts both ways—both for the party subject to, or 
potentially subject to, the absolute conflict and for the other party to the litigation. 
For the party subject to the absolute conflict, important factors include the likelihood 
that foreign law will be enforced as evidenced by myriad subinquiries, the 
characteristics of the conflicting foreign law, the status of the party to the litigation, 
the fairness of bearing burdens reciprocal to the benefits the party enjoys under U.S. 
law and the U.S. legal system, advance notice of the absolute conflict, and whether 
the absolute conflict was in some way of the party’s own making. On the flip side, 
hardship to the other party to the litigation asks the degree to which that party would 
suffer by denying it materials vital to its case and whether the materials could be 
obtained without triggering an absolute conflict. 
Ultimately, the Article’s goals are twofold: one, to identify absolute conflicts as a 
distinct legal phenomenon and to bring some systematic coherence to an increasingly 
important but messy and underscrutinized area of the law; and two, to advance a new 
approach to absolute conflicts oriented around the rule of law and party rights that 
promises better outcomes not only for parties but also for states and the international 
system. 
I. DESCRIBING ABSOLUTE CONFLICTS 
This Part provides a largely descriptive account of absolute conflicts in that it 
describes them as a distinct legal phenomenon and classifies the myriad forms they 
may take. Before we can start crafting resolutions to absolute conflicts, it is necessary 
to appreciate what they are and how they relate to, and differ from, other doctrines. 
As noted, one major objective of the Article is to define a new legal concept and give 
it doctrinal coherence. Only once that is accomplished can we proceed toward 
solving the dilemmas absolute conflicts pose for transnational actors, states, and the 
international system. 
I therefore begin by distinguishing absolute conflicts from true conflicts of law 
and other doctrines courts and lawyers tend to confuse with or blur into absolute 
conflicts like act of state and comity. Distinguishing absolute conflicts from these 
other doctrines is pivotal to the Article’s thesis because the other doctrines rely 
principally, if not exclusively, on weighing state interests to resolve conflicts 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
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between different states’ laws or official acts and, as a result, marginalize or disregard 
party rights entirely. Yet as Part II argues, the best way to resolve absolute conflicts 
is to focus specifically on party rights and fairness. After distinguishing absolute 
conflicts from these other doctrines, I then develop a typology of absolute conflicts 
across different subject areas and describe different substantive and procedural rules 
that presently attend the different types of absolute conflicts I identify. 
This Part accordingly seeks to describe the law in new and helpful ways for courts 
and litigants so as to open up novel avenues of analysis that will also set the stage for 
Part II’s normative analysis. Along the way, it also irons out previously unidentified 
inconsistencies in the law—for example, whether the foreign sovereign compulsion 
defense is an objection to judicial subject matter jurisdiction or to prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction—thereby promoting overall doctrinal coherence. 
A. Distinguishing Absolute Conflicts from Other Doctrines 
1. Versus True Conflicts  
Numerous courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have referred to situations 
of overlapping contradictory laws, or what this Article calls absolute conflicts, as 
“true conflicts of law.”37 This usage is intuitive and, in itself, unproblematic. What 
is problematic is that a longstanding and robust discipline of conflict of laws already 
and regularly uses the term “true conflicts of law,” and uses it differently.38 And these 
semantic variances can seriously mislead courts when it comes to analyzing and 
resolving real absolute conflicts of law. 
Most problematically, courts have deployed the term “true conflict” not only to 
describe directly contradictory laws (again, what this Article calls an absolute 
conflict) but also to distinguish absolute conflicts from situations where one state’s 
law prohibits what another state’s law permits or encourages, but does not 
require—misguidedly giving the former scenario the exclusive mantle of “true 
conflict.” The most egregious example is probably the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California.39 There the Court extended the 
Sherman Antitrust Act to prohibit entirely foreign conduct by British reinsurers 
inside Britain in conformity with British law.40 The Court found that “[n]o conflict 
exists . . . where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the 
laws of both. Since the London reinsurers do not argue that British law requires 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–799 (1993); see also 
Diaz-Barba v. Kismet Acq., LLC, Nos. 08cv1446 BTM (BLM), 08cv1572 BTM (BLM), 2010 
WL 2079738, at *11–14 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2010); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 
F.R.D. 429, 446–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 242 F.R.D. 199, 218 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 38. See Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1171 (11th Cir. 2009) (A true 
conflict is “when two or more states have a legitimate interest in a particular set of facts in the 
litigation and the laws of those states differ or would produce a different result.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); GEICO v. Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992); cf. 
Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 187 n.15 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 39. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 40. Id. at 798–99. 
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them to act in some fashion prohibited by the law of the United States, or claim 
that their compliance with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible, we 
see no conflict with British law.”41 Consequently, the Court determined there was 
no “true conflict” of laws.42 
Within the venerable discipline of conflict of laws, this use of “true conflict” is 
wrong. And for parties subject to actual absolute conflicts, it may be dangerous. To 
begin with, the term “true conflict” originated out of Brainerd Currie’s governmental 
interest approach to choice of law questions.43 According to Currie, courts deciding 
choice of law questions “should first of all determine the governmental polic[ies]” 
expressed by the laws of the involved states and “whether the relationship of the . . . 
state to the case at bar . . . is such as to bring the case within the scope of the state’s 
governmental concern, and to provide a legitimate basis for the assertion that the 
state has an interest in the application of its policy in this instance.”44 From this 
governmental interest analysis, three main categories emerge: false conflicts, true 
conflicts, and unprovided-for cases.45 False conflicts occur when only one involved 
state has an interest in applying its law.46 Because only one state is interested in 
applying its law, there is no conflict of laws and the sole interested state’s law 
applies.47 True conflicts, by contrast, occur when more than one involved state has 
an interest in applying its law.48 And unprovided-for cases occur when no involved 
state has an interest in applying its law.49 Within this widely influential framework, 
the conflict of laws in Hartford Fire easily qualifies as—indeed it is a paradigmatic 
example of—a true conflict of laws: both the United States and Great Britain had 
strong interests in applying their laws to advance their respective policies. 
Already one might start to see that limiting the label “true conflict” to directly 
contradictory laws and refusing to attach it where—according to the Supreme 
Court—a state has a strong interest promoting but not necessarily requiring certain 
                                                                                                                 
 
 41. Id. at 799 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. at 798–99. 
 43. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws 
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 259 (1958); Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: 
Adjudication Versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 230 n.82, 245 
(1958). See generally Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 
COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958). 
 44. Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and 
the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (1958).  
 45. See id. at 9–10, 10 n.3. Also, “[i]n his later work, Currie recognized a fourth category, 
what he called an ‘apparent conflict,’ which is something between a false and a true conflict.” 
Symeon C. Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and 
Tomorrow, in 298 RECUEIL DES COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (2002) (emphasis omitted). 
 46. See Currie, supra note 44, at 10 (“When one of two states related to a case has a 
legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy and the other has none, there is no 
real problem; clearly the law of the interested state should be applied.”). 
 47. See id.  
 48. See EUGENE F. SCOLES, PETER HAY, PATRICK J. BORCHERS & SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS 28 (4th ed. 2004). 
 49. See id.  
2016] ABSOLUTE CONFLICTS OF LAW 729 
 
conduct,50 is incorrect. Not only that, it can be dangerous for parties subject to actual 
contradictory laws. As the conventional moniker of Currie’s approach self-evidently 
demonstrates, it is all about “governmental interest[s]”51 and has, according to Currie 
himself, nothing to do with party rights.52 In fact, Currie unabashedly promoted 
subverting party rights, as well as interests of other states, to vindicate the forum 
state’s policies.53 Currie’s approach has been criticized on these and other grounds,54 
but it also has been greatly influential and acceptable to courts.55  
Herein lies the huge difference between true “true conflicts” and “absolute 
conflicts” of law. With the vast majority of true conflicts of law, parties are able to 
comply with both laws simultaneously. Whatever one thinks about how best to 
resolve that choice of law, it is not inherently unfair to parties to look to the 
competing state interests at stake in choosing one state’s law over the other. With 
absolute conflicts of law, however, it is impossible to comply with both laws 
simultaneously. This impossibility renders absolute conflicts qualitatively different 
from true conflicts and instantly imports powerful rule of law considerations that 
disfavor subjecting parties to contradictory legal commands in arbitrary fashion.  
Although limiting the “true conflict” label to what I am calling absolute conflicts 
is wrong because it does not capture the vast majority of choice of law cases 
involving differing state interests, Currie’s label could, on its own terms, potentially 
cover absolute conflicts since the states have conflicting interests. But the whole 
point of this Article is to carve out a separate category of conflicts that is qualitatively 
different, and to name that category. Let me also reiterate that this Part does not seek 
to explain how best to resolve absolute conflicts; for that, see Part II. All I want to 
do here is show that absolute conflicts are qualitatively different from what 
conventionally are understood as true conflicts and, accordingly, demand a 
qualitatively different analysis—one that, entirely unlike conventional true conflict 
approaches, preferences fairness to parties over raw state interests. 
2. Versus Act of State 
Absolute conflicts are also sometimes confused with or blurred into related 
foreign affairs doctrines involving conflicts between U.S. and foreign law like the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798–99 (1993). 
 51. Currie, supra note 44, at 10. 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Governmental Interest Analysis: A House Without 
Foundations, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 459, 460 (1985) (“[Governmental] interest[s] have no clear 
meanings any more. The foundations of interest analysis, which Currie strived so hard to 
develop, are in complete disarray.”); Friedrich K. Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of 
Interest Analysis, 32 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 9–14 (1984). 
 55. See, e.g., Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. AIG Oil Rig of Tex. Inc., 846 F.2d 319, 322 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (applying the Currie governmental analysis); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729 
(Cal. 1967) (same); Mellk v. Sarahson, 229 A.2d 625, 629 (N.J. 1967) (same). 
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act of state doctrine56 and comity.57 This blurring is understandable; in a very general 
sense, all of these doctrines ask what happens when an act of the U.S. sovereign 
comes up against an act of a foreign sovereign. But like true conflicts, these other 
doctrines deal principally with competing interests of different states or sovereigns. 
However, because this Article argues that absolute conflicts are, and should be 
treated as, dealing principally with fairness to parties, blurring absolute conflicts with 
state-centered foreign affairs doctrines can produce doctrinally wrong and 
normatively undesirable outcomes within the Article’s argument. 
As noted earlier, the most prominent absolute conflict doctrine in U.S. law is 
called “foreign sovereign compulsion.”58 It is basically a defense to the application 
of U.S. law abroad and “recognizes that a defendant trying to do business under 
conflicting legal regimes may be caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place 
where compliance with one country’s laws results in violation of another’s.”59 Under 
this doctrine, courts will (sometimes) not apply U.S. law prohibiting a party’s foreign 
activity if the party shows that the conduct was actually compelled by foreign law 
and not just encouraged or approved.60 Yet things start to get messy where courts 
consider foreign sovereign compulsion alongside and sometimes in tandem with the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. The act of state doctrine “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the 
validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own 
territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). “[T]he doctrine 
requires American courts to reject private claims based on the contention that the damaging 
act of another nation violates either American or international law.” Mannington Mills, Inc. v. 
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292–93 (3d Cir. 1979); see also In re Vitamin C Antitrust 
Litig. (In re Vitamin C II), 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. 
N.Z. Dairy Bd., Milk Prods. Holdings (N. Am.) Inc., 954 F. Supp. 733, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D. Del. 1970).  
 57. International comity is “neither a matter of absolute obligation . . . nor of mere 
courtesy and good will,” but of conscious legislative, executive, or judicial deference given 
consideration of international duty and convenience. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 
(1895). Courts split international comity into two distinct categories: “comity of the courts” 
and the “comity of nations.” See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Comity of the courts, otherwise known as adjudicative comity, 
is the doctrine “whereby judges decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters more 
appropriately adjudged elsewhere.” Id. Comity of nations or prescriptive comity on the other 
hand is “the respect sovereign nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their laws.” 
Id. (citing J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 38 (1834)) (defining comity 
of nations as “the true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one nation within 
the territories of another”); see also In re Vitamin C II, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 542–43. 
 58. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958) (originating the 
doctrine); see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 
(9th Cir. 1976) (explaining the doctrine). 
 59. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig. (In re Vitamin C I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 441, 442 
(1987). 
 60. See, e.g., Trugman-Nash, 954 F. Supp. at 736 (finding “an actual and material conflict 
between American antitrust law and New Zealand law” entitling defendants to invoke “foreign 
sovereign compulsion” and dismissing claims); Interamerican, 307 F. Supp. at 1298–99. 
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act of state doctrine, which bars U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of public acts 
of another sovereign in its own borders.61  
Which is not to say that the doctrinal connection between foreign sovereign 
compulsion and act of state makes no sense. It does: if foreign law compels the 
foreign activity, then overriding the application of that law in the foreign territory 
would be tantamount to U.S. courts invalidating the public act of another sovereign 
in its own territory.62 Yet at least in line with this Article’s thesis, the two doctrines 
serve different purposes. As one court so far has put it, “The act of state doctrine 
derives from both separation of powers and respect for the sovereignty of other 
nations,”63 while foreign sovereign compulsion stems from fairness to parties subject 
to conflicting legal obligations. Thus “[r]ather than being concerned with the 
diplomatic implications of condemning another country’s official acts,” foreign 
sovereign compulsion “focuses on the plight of a defendant who is subject to 
conflicting legal obligations under two sovereign states.”64 On this view, foreign 
sovereign compulsion’s doctrinal root is fairness to parties, not state interests. 
We will return to foreign sovereign compulsion in the taxonomy below and in 
Part II.65 For now, suffice it to say that not all courts view it as a fairness doctrine. 
Indeed, many courts following the lead of the most recent Restatement have erased 
or minimized the doctrine’s original fairness kernel in the Supreme Court decision 
Societe Internationale v. Rogers,66 which birthed the doctrine, and have elevated in 
its stead competing state sovereignty concerns as the doctrine’s chief focus. Part II 
argues that this doctrinal adulteration both contradicts Rogers and produces bad 
outcomes. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004); Banco Nacional de 
Cuba, 376 U.S. at 401; Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
 62. See Timberlane Lumber Co., 549 F.2d at 606 (“A corollary to the act of state doctrine 
in the foreign trade antitrust field is the often-recognized principle that corporate conduct 
which is compelled by a foreign sovereign is also protected from antitrust liability, as if it were 
an act of the state itself.”); In re Vitamin C II, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 544; Interamerican, 307 F. 
Supp. at 1299. But consider that U.S. courts defer to foreign governments and may not review 
foreign law due to an act of state, yet may not defer to foreign government interpretations of 
its own law for foreign sovereign compulsion purposes. See, e.g., In re Vitamin C II, 810 F. 
Supp. 2d at 552. 
 63. In re Vitamin C I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
 64. Id. at 551; accord Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(describing the conflicting foreign laws defense in employment law) (“§ 623(f)(1)’s evident 
purpose [is] to avoid placing overseas employers in the impossible position of having to 
conform to two inconsistent legal regimes, one imposed from the United States and the other 
imposed by the country in which the company operates.”). 
 65. See infra Part I.B; infra Part II. 
 66. See 357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958) (“It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution 
constitutes a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the 
laws preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.”). I should note that the cases in 
this area also require good faith. Thus if the party attempts to use foreign law to evade U.S. 
law, the defense will not apply. See id.; see also Don Wallace, Jr. & Joseph P. Griffin, The 
Restatement and Foreign Sovereign Compulsion: A Plea for Due Process, 23 INT’L LAW. 593, 
599–600 (1989). 
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3. Versus Comity 
A final doctrine that is sometimes confused with or substituted for absolute 
conflict analysis is the hoary concept of “comity,” which presumes a certain degree 
of respect for foreign nations and their acts.67 A curious doctrine in that it doesn’t 
actually purport to be law, “‘Comity,’” to quote the Supreme Court, “is neither a 
matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, 
upon the other.”68 And yet, despite its repeated disavowal of legal status, comity 
tattoos and often stars in judicial opinions dealing with foreign affairs.69  
When it comes to choosing whether to apply U.S. law in ways that might interfere 
with foreign nations’ interests, prevailing comity tests invite courts to consider a 
scopious list of factors geared toward the relative strengths of different states’ claims 
to regulate the activity in question.70 William Dodge has recently tried to correct this 
approach with a characteristically insightful analysis,71 but until courts come around, 
we are left with a very open-ended judicial inquiry subject to massage and 
manipulation that tends to favor state interests.  
Comity is flexible, and conceivably could comprehend fairness to parties as part 
of the respect due foreign nations. But like true conflicts and act of state, comity is 
really focused on state interests, not party rights. And thus just as absolute conflicts 
are qualitatively different from those other doctrines, so too are they qualitatively 
different from comity. Simply put, unlike true conflicts, act of state, and comity, the 
key question presented by absolute conflicts is this: What is the fairest outcome for 
parties subject to directly contradictory laws, not for the states whose laws those 
parties are trapped between? 
B. Taxonomy  
Absolute conflicts are trans-substantive. That is to say, although they pop up in 
different areas of law and manifest in myriad ways, they all present the same basic 
dilemma of how best to resolve directly contradictory overlapping legal commands. 
U.S. law has seen absolute conflicts of law involving, among other areas, discovery 
                                                                                                                 
 
 67. See infra notes 68–69; see also Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 
613 (2d Cir. 1962); Diaz-Barba v. Kismet Acq., L.L.C., Nos. 08cv1446 BTM (BLM), 
08cv1572 BTM (BLM), 2010 WL 2079738, at *11–14 (S.D. Cal. May 20, 2010); In re Rubber 
Chems. Antitrust Litig., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. 
N.Z. Dairy Bd., Milk Prods. Holdings (N. Am.) Inc., 954 F. Supp. 733, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).  
 68. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
 69. An interesting move by courts is effectively translating international comity into a 
legal doctrine by using common law analyses to incorporate comity as a principle of customary 
international law. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 585–86 (1953) (incorporating 
comity into maritime common law analysis). 
 70. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 
(9th Cir. 1976) (factor balancing test); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 
403(2), 442(1)(c) (1987) (same). 
 71. William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 
(2015). 
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orders,72 privacy73 and secrecy laws,74 antiterrorism laws,75 antitrust laws,76 antifraud 
laws,77 anticorruption laws,78 securities laws,79 employment and antidiscrimination 
laws,80 bankruptcy laws,81 and in some ways even human rights laws,82 to name a 
few. 
It is not my intention here to describe every absolute conflict that has ever arisen 
in U.S. law. Instead, I want to develop and illustrate a sort of taxonomy for 
classifying different kinds of absolute conflicts. For example, an absolute conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 544 (1987); see also United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 899 
(2d Cir. 1968) (production under U.S. discovery order might have subjected defendant to 
criminal penalties under German bank-secrecy laws); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW § 442 (1987). 
 73. See Trade Dev. Bank v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35, 41 n.3 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. 
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 74. See Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 
1992) (Chinese secrecy law); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat 
(Admin. of State Ins.), 902 F.2d 1275, 1282 (7th Cir. 1990) (Romanian secrecy law); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 691 F.2d 1384, 1386 (11th Cir. 1982) (Bahamian secrecy law). 
 75. See Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2013); Strauss v. Credit 
Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 429, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 76. See In re Vitamin C II, 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); cf. Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (addressing but not finding contradictory 
antitrust regulation). 
 77. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 78. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 550 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act). 
 79. See In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 291–95 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 80. See Abrams v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 530 (5th Cir. 1986); Pfeiffer v. 
Wm. Wrigley Jr. Co., 755 F.2d 554, 557–58 (7th Cir. 1985). Title VII also applies 
extraterritorially. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 1077, 
1077–78 (repudiating EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991)). 
 81. See Gitlin v. Societe Generale (In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp.), 93 F.3d 1036, 
1049–50 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 82. See Anthony J. Colangelo & Kristina A. Kiik, Spatial Legality, Due Process, and 
Choice of Law in Human Rights Litigation Under U.S. State Law, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 63, 
78 (2013) (discussing various stages of the litigation in Doe v. Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011), and explaining that “[a] variant of the foreign sovereign compulsion issue arose in 
the district court proceedings while the non-federal tort claims were still purportedly governed 
by District of Columbia and Delaware law. In its motion for summary judgment, Exxon argued 
that it could not be held liable for the actions of Indonesian government forces that allegedly 
harmed the plaintiffs because Exxon was actually required to employ the forces under 
Indonesian law. More specifically, Exxon argued that it could not be directly liable for 
negligent hiring and supervision of the Indonesian forces or vicariously liable for their 
activities because Exxon was ‘required by Indonesian law to have military security personnel 
on site.’ The district court rejected these arguments, finding that a genuine issue of material 
fact existed as to whether, under U.S. tort principles of employer liability for independent 
contractors and master-servant relationships, Exxon could be found liable. Had the court 
concluded that Exxon was actually and legally forced to employ the government forces and 
had no control over them under Indonesian law, foreign sovereign compulsion could have 
kicked in to block the application of U.S. law.” (citations omitted)). 
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involving two states’ procedural rules relating to the disposition of litigation would 
present a “procedural absolute conflict of laws.” Similarly, contradictory substantive 
laws regulating primary conduct unrelated to litigation would be a “substantive 
absolute conflict of laws.” And especially common are absolute conflicts involving 
both procedural and substantive laws, or “mixed absolute conflicts of laws.” While 
the line between procedure and substance is of course difficult, if not impossible, to 
draw with complete precision,83 it remains a doctrinally and heuristically useful 
distinction that can aid thinking about absolute conflicts, especially because it is so 
deeply embedded in the areas of law this Article treats.84 
Another significant distinction exists between what I refer to as “horizontal 
absolute conflicts of law,” or conflicts involving coequal states’ domestic laws, and 
“vertical absolute conflicts of law,” or conflicts involving domestic and international 
law. As the Introduction noted, I use the term “vertical” because international law 
may purport to trump national law. This distinction between horizontal and vertical 
absolute conflicts is becoming more and more important for two reasons: First, 
international law is mostly enforced via states’ domestic laws. And second, states are 
increasingly implementing or purporting to implement international law via their 
domestic laws. Consequently, where one state purports to implement international 
law in its domestic law and that law absolutely conflicts with another state’s domestic 
law, the first state can claim its law “wins” the absolute conflict by virtue of 
implementing international law. I explore the potential for, and limitations to, this 
type of argumentation. 
1. Procedural Absolute Conflicts of Law 
a. What They Look Like 
A procedural absolute conflict of laws occurs where two states’ laws relating to 
the disposition of litigation are incompatible.85 Say one state’s litigation-oriented 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. See Walter W. Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 
333, 345–46 (1933). 
 84. When dealing with conflicts of laws, the general rule is that substantive matters may 
be governed by foreign law but that procedural matters must be governed by forum law. See, 
e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 946 (Cal. 1953) (en banc). The reason behind this 
distinction is that procedural rules generally do not have direct extraterritorial effect. Of course 
because the procedural rules we are addressing here—for example, domestic discovery orders 
to foreigners to produce materials located abroad—do have extraterritorial effect, we are 
confronted with procedural absolute conflicts of law. 
 85. I would not count courts themselves feeling stuck between conflicting procedural 
laws. For instance, in In re Maxwell Communication Corp., the Second Circuit appeared to 
find an absolute conflict, which it labeled a “true conflict” under Hartford Fire, because it 
could not resolve a bankruptcy dispute in line with differing U.S. and British bankruptcy rules 
to which the debtor was subject. 93 F.3d at 1049–50. At issue were the two nations’ so-called 
avoidance rules, which “generally allow the estate to recover certain pre-petition transfers of 
property to creditors occurring within a defined period of time.” Id. at 1043. Avoidance rules 
“require courts to scrutinize a debtor’s actions prior to its bankruptcy filing and, under certain 
circumstances, to nullify those actions.” Id. at 1050. They are procedural in the sense that they 
do not regulate primary conduct outside of the litigation context; rather, “[l]iability . . . is 
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discovery order compels production of information and another state’s 
litigation-oriented law prevents the production of that information. The latter laws 
are often referred to as “blocking statutes.”86 An illustration is Article 1A of French 
Penal Code Law No. 80-538, which provides: 
Subject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and 
regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose, in 
writing, orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial 
or technical documents or information leading to the constitution of 
evidence with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings or 
in connection therewith.87 
U.S. courts have been critical of these statutes because of their distinctly procedural 
(read: litigation) focus, suggesting for instance that the French blocking statute was 
disingenuously “never expected nor intended to be enforced against French subjects 
but was intended rather to provide them with tactical weapons and bargaining chips 
in foreign courts.”88 U.S. courts accordingly have afforded the statute little weight, 
calling it “obviously . . . a manifestation of French displeasure with American 
pre-trial discovery procedures.”89 By contrast, U.S. courts have looked more 
favorably on foreign statutes that, although they may have similar nonproduction 
effects, are motivated by genuine substantive regulatory concerns within the foreign 
state.90  
                                                                                                                 
 
contingent on the subsequent commencement of insolvency proceedings.” Id. The court found 
that where a debtor is subject to the jurisdiction of multiple courts’ bankruptcy proceedings, 
“a conflict between two avoidance rules exists if it is impossible to distribute the debtor’s 
assets in a manner consistent with both rules.” Id. The court thus appeared to be using the term 
“true conflict” to describe the legal impossibility that the court itself faced in not being able to 
apply both nations’ bankruptcy rules simultaneously. It’s worth noting that if the court had 
been using the term “true conflict” in a traditional conflict of laws manner, however, the use 
would probably have been correct—the United States and England had differing laws 
reflecting different state interests and that did not put the parties in a legally impossible 
position. 
 86. See Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 526 n.6 (1987). Though some courts have also used the term to describe more 
substantive laws. See United States. v. Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294, 298 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(“Underpinning the defendants’ foreign sovereign compulsion and comity arguments is the 
existence of so-called ‘blocking statutes’ passed by Canada, the United Kingdom, and the 
European Union” prohibiting corporations and individuals from not trading with Cuba so as 
to comply with U.S. law.). 
 87. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 526 n.6. 
 88. Compagnie Francaise D’Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petrol. 
Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Adidas Ltd. v. S.S. Seatrain Bennington, 1984 
WL 423 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 1984)). 
 89. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1984). This also suggests 
that absolute conflict analysis should take into account not just fairness to the party subject to 
the absolute conflict but also fairness to the other party to the litigation, a point picked up and 
elaborated on in Part II’s discussion of hardship. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 90. See Reinsurance Co. of Am., Inc. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat (Admin. of 
State Ins.), 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Unlike a blocking statute, Romania’s law 
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The most recent Restatement takes this view, noting that “when a state has 
jurisdiction to prescribe and its courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate, adjudication 
should (subject to generally applicable rules of evidence) take place on the basis of 
the best information available,” and “[blocking] statutes that frustrate this goal need 
not be given the same deference by courts of the United States as substantive rules 
of law at variance with the law of the United States.”91 To be sure, while section 441 
of the Restatement “[i]n general” commands that “a state may not require a person 
to do an act in another state that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of 
the state of which he is a national,”92 procedural absolute conflicts get their own 
distinct section—one that explicitly allows courts to require “disclosure of 
information located outside the United States” even if that disclosure “is prohibited 
by a law, regulation, or order of a court or other authority of the state in which the 
information or prospective witness is located.”93 The test, which appears in section 
442 and has been widely adopted by courts, is as follows: 
In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of 
information located abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or 
agency in the United States should take into account the importance to 
the investigation or litigation of the documents or other information 
requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the 
information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative 
means of securing the information; and the extent to which 
noncompliance with the request would undermine important interests of 
the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine 
important interests of the state where the information is located.94 
The Restatement justifies the different treatment by distinguishing between 
substantive and procedural laws:  
§ 441 is concerned with conflicts in substantive law between two or more 
states in connection with activities or transactions in situations where 
both states have jurisdiction to prescribe; this section, in contrast, deals 
with the litigation process, and in particular with pretrial procedures, in 
situations where the forum state by definition has jurisdiction over the 
parties and the proceedings, and foreign substantive law would not 
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ordinarily be involved. Accordingly, somewhat less deference to the law 
of the other state may be called for.95 
In sum, U.S. courts and the Restatement view skeptically foreign laws that create 
procedural absolute conflicts with U.S. law and that appear devoid of genuine 
substantive regulatory concerns. As a result, U.S. courts are less likely to defer to 
these foreign laws and more likely to effectuate U.S. law compelling production. 
b. How To Argue Them 
The Restatement language also raises interesting and potentially serious questions 
about what type of jurisdiction is at play when it comes to procedural absolute 
conflicts and, indeed, absolute conflicts of law generally. Is it the jurisdiction to 
prescribe rules regulating conduct, or “prescriptive jurisdiction”96 (sometimes 
imprecisely called “legislative jurisdiction”97); the jurisdiction to enforce those rules, 
or “enforcement jurisdiction,”; the jurisdiction of a court to adjudicate a dispute, or 
“subject matter jurisdiction;” or the court’s jurisdiction over a party, or “personal 
jurisdiction”? Or is it some amalgam of these types of jurisdiction? Needless to say, 
the answer is of considerable litigation importance. Prescriptive jurisdiction defects 
go to the merits of the case and may be waived if not timely raised.98 Similarly, an 
objection to personal jurisdiction vindicates a party right that also must be timely 
raised or waived.99 On the other hand, judicial subject matter jurisdiction defects can 
be raised at any time, including by the court sua sponte.100 
The Restatement is remarkably question begging on this point. Comment a. 
states: “Discovery for use in a judicial or administrative proceeding is an exercise 
of jurisdiction by a state, whether it emanates from an order of a court or from a 
demand by a party pursuant to a statute or rule of practice.”101 This is not very 
helpful. The comment then goes on to instruct courts to measure “such exercise of 
jurisdiction . . . with the principle of reasonableness,” and parenthetically references 
sections 403 and 421.102 But this too is not very helpful, since section 403 governs 
                                                                                                                 
 
 95. Id. § 442 cmt. e. 
 96. See id. §§ 401(a), 402. 
 97. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
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Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982). 
 100. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); see also infra note 110. 
 101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442 cmt. a (1987). 
 102. Id.  
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the reasonableness of a state’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, while section 421 
governs the reasonableness of a state’s adjudicative jurisdiction. Which is it?  
Fortunately, courts addressing this question seem to have gotten it right, at least 
when it comes to procedural absolute conflicts, and appear to treat the exercise of 
jurisdiction as an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction. Whether the jurisdiction is 
exercised by a legislature or court, it relates to the application and enforcement of 
rules, not to the court’s inherent power to hear a case. For example, a foreign 
blocking statute certainly looks like an exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction by a 
foreign state in that it seeks to regulate not just parties but also U.S. courts. The 
Supreme Court has basically said as much, observing “the language of the [French 
blocking] statute, if taken literally, would appear to represent an extraordinary 
exercise of legislative jurisdiction by the Republic of France over a United States 
district judge.”103 On the flip side, from the perspective of a party abroad subject to 
a U.S. court’s discovery order, that order also looks like not only an exercise of 
adjudicatory authority but also of prescriptive authority in a foreign locale—albeit 
by a court instead of a legislature—backed up by some enforcement capability.104 As 
in other areas,105 here the academic categories of prescriptive, adjudicative, and 
enforcement jurisdiction tend to lose heuristic value. A discovery order, for instance, 
embroils all three: a rule telling a foreign actor how to behave, as a result of the 
court’s power over the parties and the case, accompanied by the threat of a sanction.  
Teasing out these distinctions may sound like hairsplitting depending on one’s 
background in the intricacies of the law of jurisdiction. But what is crucial from both 
a procedural and practical litigation perspective is this: the exercise of jurisdiction is 
emphatically not a question of subject matter jurisdiction, or the power of the court 
to hear the case to begin with—a challenge that may be raised at any time, including 
by the court itself. There is no question that the court has power over the dispute; 
rather, the question is about how and when the court’s exercise of power should 
extend to compel actors abroad to violate foreign law. This is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]t is well settled that such [foreign blocking] 
statutes do not deprive an American court of the power to order a party subject to its 
jurisdiction to produce evidence even though the act of production may violate that 
statute.”106 In other words, “the task” U.S. courts face “is not one of defining power 
but of developing rules governing the proper exercise of power.”107 As one lower 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 
482 U.S. 522, 544 n.29 (1987). 
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Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 204–06 (1958); see also id. at 540 (explaining that the 
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court recently put it, “the United States Supreme Court held that an American court 
has the power to require a party to respond to discovery conducted in accordance 
with the Rules of Civil Procedure, although the court must make a discretionary 
determination about whether to do so on the facts of the case.”108 In short, the court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over the case; the real question is whether to apply 
and enforce its rules of procedure where they are incompatible with foreign rules to 
which the party is also subject.  
This classification of jurisdiction is also consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure themselves—in particular, the “well established [law] that a failure to 
object to discovery requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any 
objection.”109 Again, if the issue were purely one of subject matter jurisdiction, it 
would not be subject to waiver; courts could even raise it sua sponte.110 Moreover, if 
we consider the objection to jurisdiction as going to party rights and fairness as this 
Article suggests, then like an objection to personal jurisdiction, the jurisdictional 
challenge is personal to the party and may be waived accordingly.  
Interestingly, and as we will see next, courts consider substantive absolute 
conflicts as going not to the merits, but rather to the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction. This seems counterintuitive: absolute conflicts of procedural law go to 
the merits of a case, while absolute conflicts of substantive law go to judicial subject 
matter jurisdiction. I contend that the latter view is wrong under recent Supreme 
Court case law and that substantive absolute conflicts too ought to be treated as issues 
of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction going to the merits of a case. 
2. Substantive Absolute Conflicts of Law 
a. What They Look Like 
Substantive absolute conflicts of law occur when two states’ substantive laws 
regulating primary conduct compel contradictory actions. Most prevalent so far are 
conflicts involving antitrust laws,111 though substantive absolute conflicts are by no 
means limited to antitrust and have arisen in areas as diverse as employment law,112 
trading with the enemy,113 and human rights.114 
                                                                                                                 
 
 108. In re Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 539 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 109. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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Brodie, 174 F. Supp. 2d 294, 296 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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Early case law in the antitrust realm adopted a fairly strict position that if 
“defendants were compelled by regulatory authorities” of a foreign government to 
violate U.S. law abroad, “such compulsion is a complete defense to an action under 
the [U.S.] antitrust laws.”115 This position comports with the Restatement’s general 
view, noted above, that “a state may not require a person to do an act in another state 
that is prohibited by the law of that state or by the law of the state of which he is a 
national; or to refrain from doing an act in another state that is required by the law of 
that state or by the law of the state of which he is a national.”116 In this context, the 
foreign sovereign compulsion defense requires that foreign law actually compel the 
violation of U.S. law (and not merely permit or encourage it),117 and that the 
compulsion is “genuine,” that is, not “sought or induced by the defendants.”118 The 
rationale behind this position draws in part from respect for foreign sovereigns but 
more profoundly from the systemic desire to foster commerce among nations and to 
protect parties subject to contradictory overlapping laws.  
For instance, in Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had illegally boycotted the plaintiff so as to deny 
it Venezuelan crude oil.119 The District Court for the District of Delaware, in an 
opinion by Judge Caleb Wright, held that foreign sovereign compulsion by the 
Venezuelan regulatory authorities in Venezuela constituted “a complete defense” to 
the operation of U.S. antitrust law there.120 According to the court, “[i]t requires no 
precedent . . . to acknowledge that sovereignty includes the right to regulate 
commerce within the nation. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there 
have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the 
sovereign.”121 On this rationale, the court essentially interpreted the Sherman Act as 
not reaching the foreign activity, noting that “[a]nticompetitive practices compelled 
by foreign nations are not restraints of commerce, as commerce is understood in the 
Sherman Act, because refusal to comply would put an end to commerce. . . . The 
Sherman Act does not go so far.”122  
This reasoning obviously exhibits strong deference to foreign sovereigns and, in 
this respect, conjures the related act of state doctrine.123 Yet upon inspection, the 
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opinion also relies heavily and more centrally on the systemic desire to foster trade 
among nations and to protect the rights of parties subject to conflicting overlapping 
laws. The court’s point about activity compelled by a foreign government not fitting 
within the Sherman Act’s definition of “commerce” was fundamentally about 
preserving the ability of U.S. actors to engage in commerce with other nations. The 
court explained, “Commerce may exist at the will of the government, and to impose 
liability for obedience to that will would eliminate for many companies the ability to 
transact business in foreign lands.”124 To be sure, “compliance with [foreign] 
authority” necessarily excused the operation of U.S. law because such compliance 
was, “in fact, a sine qua non of doing business.”125 The court also emphasized party 
rights, stressing the “defect[]” in the plaintiffs’ position that defendants were liable 
for anticompetitive conduct as a matter of law because “[i]t ignores defendants’ right 
to show that participation in what might otherwise be an illegal boycott is immunized 
by acquiescence in the order of a foreign government.”126 The court even went so far 
as to conclude that “[t]he ends of justice” required terminating the litigation in 
defendants’ favor.127 
More recent cases have softened the impact of this hard and fast rule that foreign 
sovereign compulsion is a “complete defense” to U.S. law128 both by not deferring 
to foreign governments’ interpretations of their laws and by construing foreign laws 
narrowly so as to avoid absolute conflicts with U.S. law. For instance, unlike the 
court in Interamerican, which refused to “undertake . . . an inquiry”129 into the 
meaning and validity of Venezuelan law, the Eastern District of New York very 
recently “decline[d] to defer to the Chinese government’s statements to the court 
regarding Chinese law” in a potential substantive absolute conflict case styled In re 
Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation.130 At issue was the degree of deference owed the 
Chinese government’s statements regarding the effect of Chinese regulations that 
defendants claimed compelled their anticompetitive cartel. The Chinese government 
took the position that Chinese law indeed compelled the activity, but the court—after 
a detailed and searching independent evaluation of Chinese law—disagreed.131 
Similarly, in United States v. Brodie, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania construed 
Canadian, U.K., and European Union laws “prohibiting corporations and individuals 
from not trading with Cuba in order to” comply with U.S. laws as not reaching 
defendants’ sales of ion exchange resins to Cuba.132 While it of course cannot be 
certain that these cases would have been decided differently had they been decided 
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around the time Interamerican was decided in 1970, the tenor of the opinions, and in 
particular the absence of strong deference to foreign governments, manifestly differs 
from earlier decisions. 
Thus unlike procedural absolute conflicts, courts have been more willing to hold 
that substantive absolute conflicts excuse the operation of U.S. law abroad. The 
test appears to have sprung from some combination of respect for foreign 
sovereigns and, more fundamentally, the desire to foster international trade and 
protect party rights, when—to quote the recent decision in In re Vitamin C Antitrust 
Litigation—defendants are “caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place 
where compliance with one country’s laws results in violation of another’s.”133 
And while recent decisions show that courts are still willing to excuse the operation 
of U.S. law on this rationale,134 there has been movement away from deferring 
conclusively to foreign sovereigns and toward construing foreign law so as not to 
generate absolute conflicts with U.S. law if possible.  
b. How To Argue Them 
Another major difference from procedural absolute conflicts is that courts 
addressing substantive absolute conflicts treat the issue as going to judicial subject 
matter jurisdiction instead of to the merits. The court in Interamerican, for example, 
cast its reasoning in subject matter jurisdiction language, explaining that “[t]he 
Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on United States courts over acts of foreign 
sovereigns.”135 And the courts in both Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. New Zealand Dairy 
Board and In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation framed the issues, respectively, as 
whether “this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ antitrust claims was 
precluded”136 and whether judicial “abstention” was warranted.137 As noted at the 
end of the last section, it seems counterintuitive that courts and lawyers treat 
procedural absolute conflicts as going to the prescriptive scope and application of the 
law and thus the merits of a case, while substantive absolute conflicts of classic 
conduct-regulating rules are treated as going to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
And it is also probably wrong under recent Supreme Court precedent. 
Judicial decisions classifying substantive absolute conflicts as going to the court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction have done so by taking a cue from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hartford Fire.138 There the Court evaluated whether the Sherman Act 
reached foreign conduct as a question of the district court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction.139 But as Justice Scalia pointed out in dissent, this was incorrect. Justice 
Scalia explained that “the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act . . . has nothing 
to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substantive law turning on 
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whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted regulatory power over the 
challenged conduct.”140 Justice Scalia then observed that “[t]here is, however, a type 
of ‘jurisdiction’ relevant to determining the extraterritorial reach of a statute; it is 
known as ‘legislative jurisdiction,’ or ‘jurisdiction to prescribe.’”141 And it “refers to 
‘the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or activities,’ and is 
quite a separate matter from ‘jurisdiction to adjudicate.’”142 On this view, the proper 
inquiry in Hartford Fire was not whether courts had subject matter jurisdiction over 
claims arising out of foreign conduct but rather whether Congress intended the 
Sherman Act’s substantive conduct regulating rules to reach that conduct.143 To 
resolve this question, Justice Scalia employed longstanding canons of statutory 
construction144 to conclude that Congress did not so intend. 
Justice Scalia got his revenge, so to speak, in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank, a case involving claims by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for 
fraud in connection with stock purchased on a foreign exchange.145 At issue was if, 
and how, a statutory presumption against extraterritorial application attached to the 
U.S. Securities Exchange Act.146 Writing for the majority this time, Justice Scalia 
began the opinion’s legal discussion with a section devoted entirely to “correct[ing] 
a threshold error in the Second Circuit’s analysis.”147 Namely, the lower court had 
mistakenly “considered the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] to 
raise a question of subject-matter jurisdiction.”148 Justice Scalia corrected this error: 
“But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, 
which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, ‘refers to a 
tribunal’s power to hear a case.’”149 After distinguishing the extraterritorial reach of 
§ 10(b)’s prescriptive conduct regulating rule prohibiting fraud as “an issue quite 
separate” from the subject matter jurisdiction of U.S. courts, Justice Scalia observed 
that as to the latter, under the Exchange Act “[t]he District Court here had jurisdiction 
under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate the question whether § 10(b) applies to [the 
defendant’s] conduct,”150 and quoted the relevant language of § 78aa, which provides 
“[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of 
violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and regulations thereunder.”151  
Morrison made clear, in other words, that the reach and application of a 
substantive conduct regulating law is a question of prescriptive, not judicial subject 
matter, jurisdiction. And thus under Morrison, absolute conflicts of substantive 
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conduct regulating laws similarly ought to be treated as questions of prescriptive, not 
judicial subject matter, jurisdiction. Consequently, substantive absolute conflict 
issues go to the merits, not the court’s power to hear a case. Further recommending 
this approach is that it irons out a doctrinal and procedural wrinkle between 
procedural and substantive absolute conflicts of law, thereby making the overall law 
of absolute conflicts more coherent. 
3. Mixed Absolute Conflicts of Law 
a. What They Look Like 
As the name suggests, mixed absolute conflicts of law involve a combination of 
substantive and procedural laws that place parties in a legally impossible position 
because complying with one law necessarily means violating another. By far the 
most common mixed absolute conflict entails a domestic discovery order designed 
to facilitate litigation of a domestic substantive legal policy that runs up against a 
foreign law prohibiting the discovery not just for some strategic litigation purpose 
(like a blocking statute) but also to protect a foreign substantive legal policy.  
The most famous and doctrinally prolific mixed absolute conflict case is Societe 
Internationale v. Rogers, which birthed the foreign sovereign compulsion defense.152 
In what the Supreme Court described as “an intricate litigation,” the U.S. Alien 
Property Custodian seized assets of the German firm I. G. Farben during World War 
II.153 After the war, a Swiss holding company brought suit under the Trading with 
the Enemy Act to recover a portion of the seized assets on the basis that it owned 
them and was not “an enemy or ally of enemy” within the meaning of the act.154 The 
U.S. government challenged this claim, arguing that the Swiss company was in fact 
an enemy because it was intimately connected with I. G. Farben and existed only to 
“camouflage and cloak” the firm’s true German ownership.155 To mount its case, the 
government requested production of a large number of the Swiss company’s banking 
records. The problem was that the Swiss Federal Attorney had determined that the 
disclosure would have violated Swiss Penal Code provisions prohibiting “economic 
espionage” and Swiss Bank Law protecting secrecy of bank records, and accordingly 
confiscated the records.156 Although the U.S. district court found that both the Swiss 
authorities and the Swiss firm had acted in good faith in seeking to comply with the 
production order and that there was no evidence of collusion to conceal the records, 
the court nevertheless ultimately granted the government’s motion to dismiss the 
case for failure to comply with the order.157 The court of appeals affirmed.158 
On certiorari, the Supreme Court framed the issue as “whether the District Court 
properly exercised its powers under Rule 37(b) [of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] by dismissing this complaint despite the findings” that the Swiss firm had 
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not colluded with Swiss authorities and had acted in good faith to try to produce the 
records.159 The Court began by noting that the district court’s powers under the 
Federal Rules are not unbounded; rather, they “must be read in light of the provisions 
of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of property without due 
process of law,” and thus, “there are constitutional limitations upon the power of 
courts, even in aid of their own valid processes, to dismiss an action without 
affording a party the opportunity for a hearing on the merits of his cause.”160 
According to the Court, outright dismissal violated this due process guarantee 
because “fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for 
nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing 
compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.”161 With this, the foreign sovereign 
compulsion defense was born. 
Yet it is important to appreciate what the Court did and did not decide in Rogers. 
The Court did not say that an absolute conflict with foreign law barred the district 
court from issuing the discovery order in the first place. Instead, it was the nature of 
the sanction for failure to comply with the order—namely, dismissal—that 
transgressed due process by denying the party the opportunity to contest the merits 
of the case. In fact, the Court indicated in dicta at the end of the opinion that less 
severe sanctions might be appropriate due to the failure of complete disclosure—for 
instance, “drawing inferences unfavorable to petitioner.”162  
Lower courts since Rogers have taken the Court’s language and reasoning in 
varying directions, with some courts applying the foreign sovereign compulsion 
doctrine only to the nature of sanctions163 and others applying it both to the nature of 
sanctions and to the initial propriety of a discovery order requiring violation of 
foreign law abroad.164 Despite different courts taking Rogers in different directions, 
a couple of trends emerge from the post-Rogers cases that are relevant to this 
Article’s thesis. First, as noted at the outset, courts presently faced with mixed 
absolute conflicts almost always find that U.S. law compelling discovery wins out 
by counting both the procedural interest in “full and liberal discovery . . . . [as] a 
means to achieve a larger goal: the just adjudication of civil disputes”165 plus 
whatever substantive policy is advanced by the application of U.S. law. And this is 
especially so when the party requesting production is the United States.166 Second, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 159. Id. at 208. 
 160. Id. at 209. 
 161. Id. at 211. 
 162. Id. at 213. 
 163. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 
1002 (10th Cir. 1977) (“The question of good faith came into play in Societe, but it was only 
in connection with the imposition of a sanction.”). 
 164. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 554 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 520 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (collecting cases approving the use of foreign law for determining the 
propriety of both sanctions and discovery orders). 
 165. Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 549 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 166. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 903 (2d Cir. 1968); In 
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 554 (“Courts consistently hold that the United 
States interest in law enforcement outweighs the interests of the foreign states in bank secrecy 
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and relatedly, the idea that the Constitution and specifically the Due Process Clause 
places precincts on the power of courts to punish parties trapped between contradictory 
legal commands has been lost along the way in both the Restatement and judicial 
developments of the law. Yet this due process right is an ever more pertinent artifact in 
today’s world of increasingly overlapping regulatory regimes—and one that Part II 
seeks to resurrect by focusing on party rights. 
In these respects, the law’s progression can be divided into two main stages: the 
immediate post-Rogers era in which courts mainly embraced Rogers’s focus on party 
rights and fairness and adopted the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 
test that explicitly included such rights; and the post-Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law era in which courts adopted the more recent Restatement test that 
sidelines party rights and fairness in favor of a more exclusive focus on state interests. 
i. The Restatement (Second) Era 
The recent focus on state interests in mixed absolute conflict cases to the exclusion 
of party rights is not always how the law looked.167 Shortly after Rogers, the drafters 
of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law included section 40, which 
purported to govern situations “[w]here two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and 
enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent 
conduct.”168 The Restatement advised each state to: “moderat[e] the exercise of its 
enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as (a) vital national interests of 
each of the states, (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent 
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,” and other factors like where 
the required conduct was to take place, the party’s nationality, and the extent either 
state’s enforcement action could be expected to lead to compliance.169 
Courts seized upon the states’ vital national interests and the hardship on the 
parties as the most important aspects of this analysis. Thus in a case involving 
Citibank’s German branch’s refusal to produce documents where production would 
have imposed liability under German law, the Second Circuit began its analysis with 
“the obvious, albeit troublesome, requirement . . . to balance the national interests of 
the United States and Germany and to give appropriate weight to the hardship, if any, 
                                                                                                                 
 
and the hardships imposed on the entity subject to compliance.”). There are, of course, 
exceptions. See Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat (Admin. of State 
Ins.), 902 F.2d 1275, 1280 (7th Cir. 1990) (U.S. interest in providing a forum for final 
resolution of disputes and enforcement of judgments yielded to Romania’s interest in state 
secrecy). 
 167. Interestingly, some immediate post-Rogers cases appeared to assume, without 
addressing Rogers, that violation of foreign law provided an absolute bar to ordering 
production. See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962); 
Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); First Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 
616 (2d Cir. 1959). As later decisions noted, this may have resulted from the fact that these 
cases “dealt with a nonparty witness and that factor may have been the one distinguishing 
these cases from Societe [v. Rogers].” SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 
114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The impact of nonparty status will be discussed infra at Part II.B.1.iii. 
 168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965). 
 169. Id. 
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Citibank will suffer.”170 Although the court clearly seemed to consider the competing 
national interests significant, and maybe even paramount, party hardship was 
nonetheless a meaningful part of the calculus.  
The prominence of party rights at this time often even led courts to refuse to apply 
or punish noncompliance with U.S. law altogether. The Tenth Circuit in In re 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, for example, continued 
the party rights emphasis where Rogers left off, making it the central aspect of the 
court’s analysis and relied heavily on Rogers’s reasoning.171 At issue was the district 
court’s decision to hold a Delaware company, Rio Algom, and its president in civil 
contempt for failing to comply with a discovery order compelling production of 
documents located at the company’s corporate offices in Canada and to produce its 
president, who also resided in Canada, for related depositions.172 Rio Algom claimed 
that producing the records and its president would violate the Canadian Uranium 
Information Security Regulations of Canada’s Atomic Energy Control Act and, in 
turn, subject it to criminal sanctions.173 Rio Algom produced numerous other records 
and formally requested permission from the Canadian authorities to comply with the 
U.S. court’s order, which was formally denied.174 
With Rogers as its “starting point,” the Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme 
Court’s decision did not preclude a U.S. court from either ordering production or 
imposing sanctions where the production would violate foreign law.175 What was 
required, instead, was a species of “balancing approach” designed to resolve “the 
dilemma” presented by “accommodation of the principles of the law of the forum 
with the concepts of due process and international comity.”176 Although the court 
went on to quote the Restatement’s test, the key to its resolution of the absolute 
conflict centered on party rights. The court began by observing that in Rogers “the 
Supreme Court considered primarily the dilemma of the party subject to 
contradictory laws.”177 The court then went on to describe in detail Rio Algom’s 
good faith in trying to comply with the order and that its corporate and president’s 
presence in Canada were bona fide and not the result of collusion to avoid U.S. 
law.178 Only then did the court briefly consider “other relevant factors, namely the 
interests of Canada and the United States,” and found both to be “legitimate.”179 
“[B]alancing” these factors, the court concluded that the district court’s contempt 
order and resulting sanctions were unjustified.180 
Similarly, in United States v. First National Bank of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit 
relied principally on party rights and fairness to resolve the mixed absolute conflict 
                                                                                                                 
 
 170. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 902.  
 171. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977). 
 172. Id. at 994. 
 173. Id. at 994–95. 
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. at 996. 
 176. Id. at 997 (quoting Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1976). 
 177. Id. at 998 (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 998–99. 
 180. Id.  
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before it.181 The IRS had issued a summons to the bank seeking disclosure of account 
information located at the bank’s Greek branch relating to two of the bank’s 
customers. The bank refused on the basis that, under Greek law, “an employee of a 
bank who conveys any information in any manner pertaining to a deposit account is 
subject to a minimum of six months in prison.”182 Once again, the court, confronting 
a mixed absolute conflict, began its analysis with Rogers, noting the “sensitive 
balancing” of factors, including those in the Restatement.183 Among these factors, 
the “extent and nature of hardship[] [on the party] bears great weight.”184 The court 
found especially compelling both the severe criminal nature of the liability as well 
as the nonparty status of those foreign actors who would be punished under foreign 
law. More specifically, “the bank employees who would be exposed to penalty and 
First Chicago, which would be ordering its Greek employees to act unlawfully, are 
involved only as neutral sources of information and not as taxpayers or adverse 
parties in litigation.”185 Consequently, the court reversed and remanded with 
instructions to the district court to consider whether to order the bank to make a good 
faith effort to get permission from the Greek authorities to disclose the 
information.186 
Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc. supplies yet another example of 
party rights and fairness taking priority in mixed absolute conflict analysis.187 At 
issue was an order compelling production of a Swiss bank’s documents that would 
have resulted in violating Swiss bank secrecy laws.188 According to the Southern 
District of New York’s assessment of the Restatement factors, “the competing 
interests of the countries involved and the hardship imposed by compliance . . . [are] 
far more important in the balancing test” than the other factors.189 The court also 
highlighted that, despite not appearing in the Restatement factors, “the good or bad 
faith of the party resisting discovery” was integral to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rogers, as was whether the party had courted foreign legal impediments.190 The 
court found that both the United States and Switzerland had “substantial” interests in 
seeing their laws—and the substantive policies underlying those laws—enforced.191 
The court then concluded that compliance with the order would place the bank and 
its employees “in violation of the Swiss criminal law, with little likelihood of 
asserting a successful defense,”192 resulting in significant hardship.  
Of most significance, the requested documents were of low importance to the 
party requesting them and, somewhat like the Greek bank in First National Bank, the 
Swiss bank was “in the posture of a nonparty witness” since it was no longer a party 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 182. Id. at 344–45. 
 183. Id. at 345. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. at 346. 
 186. Id. at 346–47. 
 187. 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 188. Id. at 519.  
 189. Id. at 522. 
 190. Id. at 522–23. 
 191. Id. at 523–25. 
 192. Id. at 529. 
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to the litigation.193 This fact dramatically changed the fairness calculus for the court 
because it “further removes [the bank’s] nondefendant trading customers—the 
individuals and entities whose business secrets would be revealed—from the 
litigations.”194 It also rendered any sanction to a nonparty, such as “threatening a 
witness in a lawsuit with conflicting punitive measures by two sovereigns . . . 
disproportionate under the circumstances and excessively harmful to international 
comity.”195 In short, a detailed inquiry into the fairness (or unfairness) of subjecting 
the Swiss bank to U.S. law tilted the balance away from granting a motion to compel 
production.196 
This is not to say that courts always decided against the application of U.S. law 
ordering discovery under Rogers and the Restatement (Second). In SEC v. Banca 
Della Svizzera Italiana, for example, the Southern District of New York ordered 
production of information from a foreign bank regarding alleged insider trading 
where the production appeared to be in violation of foreign law where the bank was 
located.197 But the court did, in line with the cases discussed so far, focus heavily on 
Rogers and fairness in reaching its decision. The court explained that Rogers “holds 
that the good faith of the party resisting discovery is a key factor in the decision 
whether to impose sanctions when foreign law prohibits the requested disclosure,”198 
and that “[a] noncomplying party’s good or bad faith is a vital factor to consider.”199 
While the court also weighed the national interests at stake and briefly reviewed other 
“less important” factors in the Restatement,200 its finding that the bank “acted in bad 
faith” by making “deliberate use of Swiss nondisclosure law to evade . . . the 
strictures of American securities law against insider trading” took center stage.201 For 
under Rogers, the bank was “in the position of one who deliberately courted legal 
impediments . . . and who thus cannot now be heard to assert its good faith after this 
expectation was realized.”202 To permit the bank to hide behind foreign law would, 
in such a situation, “be a travesty of justice.”203 
                                                                                                                 
 
 193. Id. at 527. But the court also stressed that the bank “is not the innocent party caught 
up in events beyond its control that the Greek bank and its employees were in the First 
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 194. Id. at 530. 
 195. Id.  
 196. See id.; see also Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 118 F.R.D. 331, 
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 198. Id. at 114. 
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ii. The Restatement (Third) Era 
Things changed with the 1987 publication of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law. The relevant portions are quoted more fully earlier in the Article,204 
and place an initial and heavy emphasis on state interests, directing courts to take 
into account “the extent to which noncompliance with the [U.S. discovery] request 
would undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the 
request would undermine important interests of the state where the information is 
located.”205 Entirely gone is the hardship factor. The only party rights or fairness 
aspect of the analysis comes at the sanctions stage, where the Restatement indicates 
that courts may require a party trapped in an absolute conflict to “make a good faith 
effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information 
available.”206 Such a good faith effort has nothing to do with whether to enforce the 
order in the first place, but in line with the dicta at the end of Rogers, may mitigate 
the severest sanctions like contempt and dismissal.207 In this sense, the Restatement 
(Third) can purport to track Rogers—but it does so in a way that hits the decision’s 
conclusions in only the most arid and superficial manner, ignoring the fairness engine 
that drove the reasoning behind those conclusions. Rogers did not emphasize or even 
really discuss the competing state interests in working out its holding, but instead 
focused on the rights of the party to a fair hearing under the Due Process Clause in 
light of an antinomy that the party had neither created nor courted, and had tried in 
good faith to avoid.208 
Yet lower courts began adopting the new Restatement test in short order,209 under 
which they deemed the balance of national interests “the most important factor.”210 
The case law demonstrates that the combination of U.S. procedural and substantive 
interests favoring disclosure ordinarily outweigh foreign state interests prohibiting 
disclosure.211 Thus in Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, the Ninth 
Circuit found that “the United States’ interests in vindicating the rights of American 
plaintiffs and in enforcing the judgments of its courts” outweighed China’s interest 
in the confidentiality of its corporations’ information.212 And in In re Grand Jury 
                                                                                                                 
 
 204. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
 205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 442(1)(c) (1987). 
 206. Id. § 442(2)(a). 
 207. Id. § 441(2)(b). 
 208. See supra Part I.B.3.a. 
 209. See, e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing § 
442); Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1475 (9th Cir. 1992) 
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Ins.), 902 F.2d 1275, 1281–83 (7th Cir. 1990) (same). 
 210. See Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1476 (finding balance of national interests to be most 
important factor); see also Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012); In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); 
Madanes v. Madanes, 186 F.R.D. 279, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 211. See, e.g., Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1477; Wultz, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 559; In re Air Cargo, 
278 F.R.D. at 54; In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1280–81 (7th Cir. 1990); In re 
Activision Blizzard, Inc., 86 A.3d 531, 547–52 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 212. Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1477. 
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Subpoena, the Southern District of New York explained that “[t]he United States 
[sic] interest in enforcing its criminal laws . . . [and s]pecifically [its] . . . strong 
national interest in combatting international bribery” outweighed foreign 
confidentiality interests.213 More recently, the Southern District of New York also 
flatly observed that “[w]hen the U.S. interest ‘in fully and fairly adjudicating matters 
before its courts’ is combined with its interest in combating terrorism, the U.S. 
interest ‘is elevated to nearly its highest point, and diminishes any competing 
interests of the foreign state.’”214 Similarly, the Eastern District of New York has 
elaborated that “in weighing the factor considered most important” under the new 
Restatement test—namely, “the balance of national interests at play”—the 
combination of “a case involving violations of antitrust laws whose enforcement is 
essential to the country’s interests in a competitive economy” plus “‘the United 
States[’] . . . substantial interest in fully and fairly adjudicating matters before its 
courts’” easily outweighed “the only French interest . . . in controlling access to 
information within its borders, fueled at least in part by a desire to afford its citizens 
protections against discovery in foreign litigation.”215  
State courts also have followed this method of counting up U.S. interests. The 
Delaware Chancery Court recently explained in a mixed absolute conflict case that 
“Delaware has a substantial interest in providing an effective forum for litigating 
disputes involving the internal affairs of Delaware corporations. ‘Delaware [also] 
[has] a significant and substantial interest in actively overseeing the conduct of those 
owing fiduciary duties to shareholders of Delaware [corporations].’”216 
Consequently, “[a]gainst Delaware’s powerful interest” the French blocking statute 
didn’t stand a chance.217 Indeed, even had the state interests been evenly matched, 
according to the court, “[u]nder Sections 441 and 442 of the Restatement, a tie goes 
to the forum.”218 
It is also worth adding that any type of government enforcement has strong 
potential to tilt the balance in favor of U.S. law. In criminal cases, for example, courts 
understandably have felt the need to “accord some deference to the determination by 
the Executive Branch—the arm of the government charged with primary 
responsibility for formulating and effectuating foreign policy—that the adverse 
diplomatic consequences of the discovery request would be outweighed by the 
benefits of disclosure.”219 For its part, the Restatement acknowledges with a kind of 
ambivalent approval the argument that “when the United States government 
convokes a grand jury, issues a civil investigative demand, or brings a law suit, a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 213. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 562–63. 
 214. Wultz, 910 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (quoting Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 249 F.R.D. 
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decision has already been made that the matter is important to the national interest, 
whether it concerns an antitrust violation, securities fraud, or tax evasion.”220 Some 
courts have even taken this argument and extended it beyond enforcement by the 
government itself to private suits that seek to vindicate private as well as public 
policies. Hence in In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, the court 
explained that antitrust law “enforcement through private civil actions such as this 
one is a critical tool for encouraging compliance with the country’s antitrust laws,” 
and therefore weighed in favor of U.S. law compelling production.221 Likewise, the 
Delaware Chancery Court in In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litigation 
emphasized, “[t]he fact that this action is being pursued by a stockholder plaintiff 
rather than by a government agency does not diminish Delaware’s interest,”222 
because “[o]ur legal system has privatized in part the enforcement mechanism for 
policing fiduciaries by allowing private attorneys to bring suits on behalf of nominal 
shareholder plaintiffs.”223 
All that said, courts have not completely accepted the recent Restatement’s 
invitation to elevate state interests at the expense and to the exclusion of party rights. 
Most, if not all, courts retain vestiges of party rights elements from previous tests 
based on Rogers and the Restatement (Second), and, although these elements no 
longer occupy a paramount place in the analysis, they are often included as add-ons 
to the Restatement (Third) factors.224 Of particular significance to this Article’s 
thesis, courts have also added even more subtlety and sophistication to the fairness 
calculus, for example by starting to articulate a fairness element of reciprocity, or the 
notion that by purposefully availing themselves of benefits of the forum parties fairly 
ought to be amenable to associated burdens as well. These benefits may take the form 
of simply availing themselves of business opportunities and markets in the forum but 
also may more specifically touch upon availment of forum law.225 Part II picks up on 
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these nascent glimmerings of novel fairness concerns in the case law and develops 
them as part of a rule of law test that can aid in promoting fairness and predictability 
for parties trapped in absolute conflicts across jurisdictions. 
b. How to Argue Them  
As with procedural absolute conflicts, most courts appear to treat mixed absolute 
conflicts as questions of prescriptive jurisdiction that ask whether to apply and 
enforce U.S. law in light of a contradictory foreign law, and not as questions of the 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction or power to entertain the case. As the court in 
United States v. First National City Bank put it, “It is no longer open to doubt that a 
federal court has the power to require the production of documents located in foreign 
countries . . . . Thus, the task before us . . . is not one of defining power but of 
developing rules governing the proper exercise of power.”226 The Restatement 
(Second) also suggests that viewing foreign sovereign compulsion as both a 
prescriptive jurisdiction doctrine and an enforcement jurisdiction doctrine is correct; 
it explains that “[a] state having jurisdiction to prescribe or to enforce a rule of law 
is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction solely because such exercise requires 
a person to engage in conduct” that would violate another state’s laws.227 As with 
potential extraterritorial exercises of prescriptive jurisdiction regarding substantive 
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laws,228 “courts must take care not to impinge upon the prerogatives and 
responsibilities of the political branches of the government in the extremely sensitive 
and delicate area of foreign affairs.”229 Procedurally, these issues go to the merits230 
and, if not timely raised, may be waived in line with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.231 
4. Horizontal Absolute Conflicts of Law 
The term “horizontal absolute conflicts of law” describes situations where two or 
more coequally positioned states’ laws directly conflict, say, State A law prohibits 
what State B law requires. I extend this label to conflicts of laws between nation 
states, subnational states, and mixes of both. An exception would be if the conflict 
involves the law of a subnational state that is: (i) part of a national federal or 
quasi-federal system, (ii) the subnational law conflicts with overall system law, and 
(iii) system law is hard-wired to win because of institutionally imposed supremacy. 
For example, the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause generally empowers federal 
law to trump state law if the former is constitutional,232 effectively predetermining 
the outcome of that absolute conflict. In turn, the conflict is more properly considered 
a vertical absolute conflict because one law, U.S. federal law, swoops down to trump 
another law, U.S. state law. A more complex vertical conflict arises if international 
law purports to trump a contrary state law, whether national or subnational—an issue 
that comprises the next section’s analysis. 
Horizontal absolute conflicts, by contrast, imagine clashes between coequal laws 
in the private international law sense.233 They therefore describe clashes between 
national laws like U.S. and French law, clashes between subnational state laws like 
Texas and Oklahoma law, and even clashes between a subnational state law like 
Texas law and a national law like French law. Much has been said already about 
horizontal absolute conflicts. To be sure, they illustrate each of the categories in the 
taxonomy so far, though international law occasionally fluttered by in the form of 
treaties like the Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad.234  
Rather than rehearsing their characteristics again, I would like to highlight an 
alluring move borrowed—and to some degree modified—from domestic conflict of 
laws methodology to resolve horizontal absolute conflicts in favor of forum law in 
the international system: the notion of “apparent conflicts” of law. Perhaps the best 
explanation of apparent conflicts is that they are really “false conflicts” of law hiding 
out as “true conflicts” or “absolute conflicts,” in that they present no real conflict of 
laws among states within a governmental interest analysis. Brainerd Currie, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
 229. First Nat’l City Bank, 369 F.2d at 901. 
 230. United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 231. Richmark, 959 F.2d at 1473 (“It is well established that a failure to object to discovery 
requests within the time required constitutes a waiver of any objection.”). 
 232. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2. 
 233. See In re Maxwell Commc’n Corp., 93 F.3d 1036, 1049 (2d Cir. 1996), for an example 
of absolute conflict between U.S. and English laws. 
 234. Convention for Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, July 27, 
1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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inventor of these categories, provides the following methodological instruction to 
courts: “If the court finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the two states 
it should reconsider. A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or 
interest of one state or the other may avoid conflict.”235 Apparent conflicts therefore 
ask courts to look a little harder at what might at first appear to be a “true” or 
“absolute” conflict, but in reality is not. Courts engage in this deeper look by delving 
below the surface of the apparent conflict and identifying a more profound—indeed 
a more fundamental—policy shared by the involved states.  
For example, take a case in which a U.S. court requested information related to 
alleged bankruptcy fraud in Belize. According to the court, “The United States has a 
strong interest in ferreting out and remedying [bankruptcy] fraud.”236 And while 
Belize may have some “interest in protecting the privacy and confidentiality of the 
trust information” in Belize, “Belize has a strong interest in not allowing its trust 
laws, and the trusts created under them, to be used for fraud.”237 Consequently, “[t]his 
Belize interest in preventing fraud is consistent with United States’ national interests 
and weighs in favor of issuing an order of production, because it suggests that a 
conflict in the respective national interests may be more apparent than real.”238 
Similarly, when enforcement of U.S. antitrust law came up against the French 
blocking statute, U.S. courts had no problem disregarding the blocking statute 
because “[t]he interest in prohibiting price-fixing . . . is shared by France, given its 
membership in the European Economic Community which has also adopted 
prohibitions against price-fixing.”239 The same goes for anticorruption. As one U.S. 
court explained in a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act investigation, “the United States 
has a strong national interest in combating international bribery.”240 In turn, foreign 
confidentiality law prohibiting disclosures regarding the investigation could be set 
aside because the court concluded that the foreign nation “shares the United States 
interest in combating bribery, especially as its economic growth depends upon 
international partnerships and trade in its developing natural resources.”241 And 
finally, when it comes to “combating terrorism,” courts have found the U.S. interest 
is practically at its apogee, outstripping any foreign interest in bank secrecy, 
particularly because—and here is where apparent conflict reasoning comes in—a 
foreign state’s “interest in building confidence in its banking industry does not 
encompass an interest in protecting the confidentiality of those who participate in the 
funding of international terrorism.”242 This last example provides a fertile segue into 
the next section on vertical absolute conflicts, in which international law purports to 
trump contrary national law.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 235. Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict 
of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1242 (1963) reprinted in HAY, WEINTRAUB, AND 
BORCHERS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 524 (13th ed. 2009). 
 236. Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 549 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. (emphasis added). 
 239. In re Air Cargo Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig., 278 F.R.D. 51, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 240. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Wultz v. Bank of China Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 2d 548, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
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But before getting there, I want to conclude the horizontal absolute conflicts 
discussion with some clarifications and conclusions. First, to be clear, I do not mean 
to suggest that courts addressing horizontal absolute conflicts in the international 
arena borrow exactly from apparent conflict methodologies in the largely domestic 
conflict of laws field—a field that itself displays variation among apparent conflict 
analyses.243 It would be disingenuous, for example, to say there is no conflict of laws 
in the international scenarios discussed above. After all, foreign nations do have 
confidentiality and privacy laws that are in tension with the shared underlying 
substantive policies courts have identified. Rather, the idea is that, in the overall 
weighing of state interests or policies, the involved states would agree on the 
resolution of the conflict based on more profound shared policies. 
Relatedly, the apparent conflict analysis explicated above holds immense sway 
for the state-interest balancing that the Restatement contemplates. We have seen 
already that U.S. courts double- and sometimes triple-count U.S. interests to arrive 
at the application of forum law. The reason U.S. law ordinarily wins out, in other 
words, is that, simply put, the United States has a lot of interests according to U.S. 
courts. One is the full and fair adjudication of disputes; two is the vindication of some 
substantive legal policy; and three is deference to the executive when it comes to 
clashes with foreign laws that embroil foreign affairs. Against this flood of U.S. 
interests, a foreign nation’s comparatively “weak national interest in prohibiting 
disclosure of the information sought,”244 to quote one U.S. court, doesn’t stand a 
chance. And as illustrated below, any lingering possibility foreign interests might 
have of winning the conflict is all but eviscerated by the apparent conflict analysis 
outlined above. 
Let us begin with a classic conflict of laws state interest analysis. The decision 
maker must engage in a three-step inquiry. It must identify (1) the different states’ 
contacts with the dispute, (2) the different states’ policies, and (3) whether 
application of the states’ laws to the dispute will or will not advance those policies. 
It is probably safe to say that in the cases we’ve been discussing more than one state 
has a contact with the dispute, whether it involves transnational antifraud, antitrust, 
anticorruption, or antiterrorism. At a minimum, one state’s courts (U.S. courts in our 
scenarios) have, as the forum for procedurally resolving the dispute, a contact, while 
foreign nations have a contact with the dispute as the location of the conduct and/or 
the information requested to proceed under U.S. rules. In the end, if a case involves 
a party subject to U.S. personal jurisdiction, or produces effects in the United States, 
or touches upon U.S. interests abroad, there is a U.S. contact. The same goes for 
foreign nations. 
Once the contacts have been identified, the second step of the inquiry moves on 
to articulating the interests or policies of the different states. If we were to chart them 
out using the cases discussed throughout the Article so far, they might look 
something like Table 1. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243. For example, compare the California approach, People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 
311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957), with the Currie approach, Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third 
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Table 1. Interests or policies of the different states 
U.S. Interests Foreign Interests 
Full and fair adjudication Protection of confidentiality/privacy 
U.S. substantive policy  
Deference to executive  
And here is where apparent conflicts of the type described above add to the calculus 
in favor of applying U.S. law. If we were to again chart the interests—this time using 
an apparent conflict technique—we would have something like Table 2. 
Table 2. Interests or policies of the different states 
U.S. Interests Foreign Interests 
Full and fair adjudication Protection of confidentiality/privacy 
Shared U.S. and foreign substantive policy Shared U.S. and foreign substantive policy 
Deference to executive  
Note that in this chart, the two foreign interests are in tension with one another. Either 
protection of confidentiality hinders advancing the states’ shared substantive policy, 
or vice versa. In turn, when it comes to the third step of the analysis—which asks 
whether the state’s interests are advanced by applying its laws—the shared interest 
in the underlying substantive policy effectively moves into the category favoring 
application of U.S. law, since both states have an interest in advancing that same 
underlying policy. The chart therefore may be revised accordingly: 
Table 3. Interests or policies of the different states 
Interests advanced? 
Pro-disclosure law 
Interests Advanced? 
Anti-disclosure law 
Full and fair adjudication Foreign protection of confidentiality/privacy 
U.S. substantive policy  
Foreign substantive policy  
Deference to executive  
From a U.S. court’s perspective, this move essentially quadruples the interests 
favoring U.S. law—interests that a sole foreign interest in confidentiality cannot 
conceivably counter. 
A final point regarding apparent conflicts is that while they may sway the balance 
overwhelmingly in favor of forum law in some cases, they also open up conflict 
analysis in ways that can shore up fairness to parties. Consider the absolute conflict 
that encompasses both procedural and substantive rules. The transnational actor in 
this absolute conflict case is, in fact, caught in two absolute conflicts of law: an 
absolute conflict of procedural laws and an absolute conflict of substantive laws. 
What apparent conflict analysis shows us is that not all or even many cases involve 
both substantive and procedural absolute conflicts. An apparent conflict analysis can 
effectively remove the absolute conflict of substantive laws, leaving only the 
procedural absolute conflict—created, for example, by a foreign blocking statute. 
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Because, as the cases indicate,245 policies underlying substantive laws tend generally 
to be more powerful and carry greater penalties and likelihood of enforcement than 
those relating to procedural rules, the outcome looks fairer to the party caught in the 
absolute conflict. That is, the party is being penalized or held liable for something 
that was, in fact and law, substantively prohibited in both jurisdictions. And the party 
was on notice of that shared substantive prohibition. For rule of law criteria that value 
notice and predictability, apparent conflict analysis can therefore dampen the initial 
apparent unfairness presented by some absolute conflicts of law.  
5. Vertical Absolute Conflicts of Law 
Vertical absolute conflicts also envisage the same law applicable across the 
relevant jurisdictions, but conceptualize this law as in some sense hierarchically 
superior to each state’s domestic law because it is part of international law. It is 
neither necessary nor feasible here to engage in a larger discussion of how and why 
international law trumps national law, principally because I will limit my vertical 
conflicts category to situations where the relevant states have affirmatively adopted 
and implemented the international law at issue. To put the point another way, the 
question of whether and how international law may trump national law is most 
contentious where a state rejects or has not adopted the international law at issue, and 
goes something like: How can that international law then bind that state and, more 
specifically, override that state’s own laws in its own sovereign territory? 
But we do not need to address that question, at least for now, because we can 
make out a vertical conflicts category and jurisprudence in situations where states 
have affirmatively adopted and implemented the international law at issue, and that 
international law clashes with another aspect of the state’s domestic law. These 
situations present vertical conflicts of law because the state itself has consented to 
the applicability of international law and, indeed, has implemented it in that state’s 
own laws. Of course, implicit in this view is the assumption that international law 
exists and may bind states vis-à-vis each other, at least in some situations—here, in 
the least controversial situation where states have affirmatively agreed to be bound 
by it and have incorporated it into their own laws. Only the most ardent skeptic of 
international law would deny its force in such situations. While such skepticism 
might pose a nice academic question, in the real world of judicial decision making 
in transnational litigation, courts acknowledge the existence and force of 
international law in these situations,246 and I will too for purposes of this Article. 
Yet it is also worth noting that even if one is unwilling to assume international 
law can override national law in these situations, the outcome would likely be the 
same anyway: international law wins. A functionally alternative way to 
conceptualize the conflict is through a straight-up state interest balancing approach 
of the sort we saw in the previous section.247 Here a state’s international legal 
commitment itself resolves the absolute conflict in favor of international law. That 
is, on one side of the ledger are both states’ commitments to the international legal 
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rule at issue; while on the other side is one state’s commitment to a conflicting 
domestic rule. This conceptualization does not comport as well with the notion of a 
vertical (as opposed to a horizontal) conflict of laws, but the outcome is pretty much 
the same in that the international law at issue wins. And, as we will see, it is an 
approach that can prove useful to courts where either the international law or the 
extent to which it binds the foreign state is unclear.248  
I start with a couple of examples of the purer version of a vertical conflict in which 
international law can be conceptualized as overriding conflicting national law and 
then give an example of a more interest-based resolution in which international law 
weights the scale to outweigh a conflicting parochial foreign state interest. I end by 
discussing limitations to a vertical conflict analysis; namely, in order to use it—and 
especially the purer version—there must both be a discernible international law and 
the forum state’s domestic implementing legislation must accurately reflect that 
international law. Before jumping into these variations, I should note too that, like 
horizontal conflicts, vertical conflicts may be substantive, procedural, or mixed in 
nature because, like domestic law, international law may be substantive or 
procedural. Hence the examples that follow often implicate both a substantive 
international law (e.g., no financing terrorism) and a procedural international law 
(e.g., provide legal assistance in proceedings designed to enforce that substantive 
international law).249 
a. The Purer Version 
As the Article’s Introduction alluded to, the most prominent and illustrative 
vertical conflicts arising out of the cases so far have been between the international 
law against financing terrorism and attendant rules of mutual legal assistance on the 
one hand, and domestic bank secrecy and confidentiality laws on the other. A number 
of cases out of U.S. federal courts sitting in New York provide powerful and 
meticulous examples.  
Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, for instance, involved claims against a 
British bank for financing terrorism in the Middle East—specifically, the activity of 
Hamas.250 Plaintiffs requested disclosure of information and materials that the bank 
claimed were protected by U.K. bank secrecy laws.251 With respect to the “greatest” 
and “most important” factor in the foreign sovereign compulsion calculus—namely, 
“[t]he interests of the United States and the United Kingdom”—the district court 
appealed directly to the shared international legal commitments of both countries in 
combating financing terrorism.252 In the court’s words,  
[B]oth countries’ participation in international treaties and task forces 
aimed at disrupting terrorist financing[] outweighs the British interest in 
preserving bank customer secrecy. The United Kingdom has an interest 
in granting plaintiffs’ discovery requests, as it signed international 
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treaties in order to facilitate international cooperation to combat 
terrorism, and requires its banks to monitor customer ties to terrorists.253 
The court went on to detail extensively the international agreements, instruments, 
and the implementation thereof in the respective countries’ laws. Of particular 
significance, 
Both the United States and the United Kingdom are signatories to the 
United Nations’ International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism, which recommends that nations “adopt[] 
effective measures for the prevention of the financing of terrorism . . . .” 
Both countries are also members of the Financial Action Task Force (the 
“FATF”), which likewise seeks international cooperation in combating 
terrorist financing.254 
The court quoted the instruments’ language making it “‘an offense . . . [to] provide[] 
or collect[] funds . . . in the knowledge that they are to be used . . .’ for terrorist 
acts.”255 And, “‘[i]n particular, countries should . . . [n]ot refuse to execute a request 
for mutual legal assistance on the grounds that laws require financial institutions to 
maintain secrecy or confidentiality.’”256 These instruments, in turn, established 
“[t]hat Britain has an interest in thwarting the financing of terrorism by imposing 
monitoring and reporting obligations on its banks regarding customers who finance, 
or may be suspected of financing, terrorist acts around the world.”257 In support, the 
court quoted Article 12 of the U.N. Convention for the Suppression of the Financing 
of Terrorism (“Financing Convention”), which compels states parties to afford each 
other mutual legal assistance in combating financing terrorism.258  
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Moreover, the court also looked to domestic measures implementing international 
commitments, like the Bank of England’s direction—pursuant to a European Union 
Council regulation—to “financial institutions that any funds which they hold for on 
behalf of [sic] Hamas must not be made available to any person . . . .”259 And it 
concluded that, “pursuant to international treaties and British law, the United 
Kingdom has required that British banks, including NatWest, be subject to several 
regulatory obligations that require the investigation of bank clients’ potential links to 
known terrorists, and the disclosure of activities of customers suspected to be 
engaged in terrorist activities.”260 Ultimately, the court held that strongly shared 
international legal commitments of the United States and United Kingdom in 
combating financing terrorism and attendant rules of mutual legal assistance 
overrode Britain’s domestic interest in bank privacy, such that “ordering NatWest to 
provide plaintiffs with discovery would not ‘undermine the important interests of the 
state where the information is located,’ but rather, enforce them.”261  
Similarly, in Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., plaintiffs sued a French bank for, 
among other things, financing Hamas’ terrorist activity in the Middle East and sought 
discovery; in response, the bank interposed the French blocking statute and bank 
secrecy laws.262 Once again, “the balance of national interests” was accorded “the 
most weight” in the court’s analysis.263 And as in Weiss, the court found that “both 
countries’ participation in international treaties and task forces aimed at disrupting 
terrorist financing, outweigh the French interest, if any, in precluding Credit 
Lyonnais from responding to plaintiff’s discovery requests.”264 Like the United 
Kingdom in Weiss, 
most importantly, France, like the United States, also has expressed and 
demonstrated a profound and compelling interest in eliminating terrorist 
financing. That France has an interest in eradicating the financing of 
terrorism by imposing monitoring and reporting obligations on its banks 
regarding customers who finance, or may be suspected of financing, 
terrorist acts around the world, is established by the fact that France has 
signed international treaties that mandate such monitoring and disclosure 
and explicitly direct the member countries to cooperate in legal 
proceedings against suspected terrorist financing groups.265 
Strauss relied chiefly on the same international agreements and instruments that 
Weiss did, including the Financing Convention and the FATF.266 The court also 
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observed that France had implemented relevant EU regulations so as to “require[] its 
banks to monitor any assets potentially available to HAMAS.”267 Accordingly, the 
court found that France’s “interest in fighting global terrorist financing . . . arguably 
overrides the French concern for confidentiality with respect to its bank customers. 
Granting plaintiffs’ motion to compel would thus ‘give effect to formal . . . 
international agreements.’”268 As in Weiss, therefore, the court concluded that 
discovery would “enhance the French interest in fighting global terrorist financing 
and ‘give effect to formal . . . international agreements’ to which France is a party.”269 
b. The State Interest Version  
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, provides an example of an absolute conflict that uses 
international law more exclusively as part of a state-interest balancing approach.270 
While the cases above describe some weighing of state interests, they also speak 
of “giving effect to”271 and “enforc[ing]”272 “formal . . . international agreements” 
and commitments,273 such that international law might “override[]”274 a conflicting 
parochial concern. By contrast, Linde appeals more exclusively to a 
balancing-of-interests approach in which international law simply counts. The 
difference in the language and the tenor of the opinions in this regard is not entirely 
semantic. There is an analytical distinction between conceptualizing international 
law as a binding commitment that can override parochial concerns on the one hand, 
and international legal commitments as weights on the scale on the other. Although 
the outcome may functionally turn out the same in that both types of analysis end up 
favoring the international law at issue, this conceptual and analytical distinction is 
nonetheless worth identifying, not least because it throws into sharp relief the 
different ways international law can influence domestic judicial decision making. It 
also may end up producing different outcomes where the purer version is seen as 
conceptually and doctrinally stronger. 
Linde dealt primarily with the appropriate sanctions when a foreign bank 
continually resisted U.S. discovery on the basis of foreign bank secrecy laws.275 But 
I want to use it here as another illustration of an absolute conflict that draws from 
international law for its resolution—albeit one in a somewhat unique procedural 
posture because it was an appeal from the district court’s imposition of sanctions and 
sought collateral-order review and a writ of mandamus before the Second Circuit.276 
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Plaintiffs alleged that the Arab Bank had, among other activities, financed terrorism 
in the Middle East and requested discovery from the bank’s Jordanian and Lebanese 
branches.277 The bank refused on the basis of Jordanian and Lebanese bank secrecy 
laws.278 En route to denying appellate review, the Second Circuit found “that Jordan 
and Lebanon have expressed a strong interest in deterring the financial support of 
terrorism, and that these interests have often outweighed the enforcement of bank 
secrecy laws, even in the view of the foreign states.”279 The court noted that both 
countries were signatories to regional agreements in the Middle East and North 
Africa “which specifically renounce bank secrecy as a basis for refusing requests for 
mutual legal assistance in money laundering and terrorist financing 
investigations.”280 Interestingly, the court did not rely on the Financing Convention, 
perhaps because only Jordan was a party to the Convention and, even so, had a 
potentially problematic limiting declaration.281  
Again, I want to put aside for the moment whether the international law against 
financing terrorism contained in the Financing Convention can bind states that are 
not parties to the convention (I think it can via customary international law evidenced 
in large part by the convention).282 Even in the absence of a positive acceptance of 
the convention by both states, the court was able to use their other international 
commitments to aggregate state interests in favor of the international rule at issue. In 
this connection, the court observed that the state interest “analysis invites a weighing 
of all of the relevant interests of all of the nations affected by the court’s decision.”283 
That Jordan and Lebanon had joined regional agreements that promoted mutual legal 
assistance for financing terrorism cases and rejected bank secrecy laws as obstacles 
to such assistance was enough. In the court’s view, when the shared international 
legal interests of all concerned states were aggregated and measured against 
competing domestic state interests, international law tipped the scale in favor of its 
own rules. 
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c. Limiting Principles and Implications 
Before moving on to Part II’s more normative discussion, I want to stress an 
aspect of the vertical conflict cases that is integral to classifying them as vertical 
conflicts within this Article’s analysis—especially the purer version in which 
international law is conceptualized as overriding national law. Namely, the U.S. law 
at issue prohibited activity that was prohibited by international law and did so in 
language that was basically identical to the international legal definitions contained 
in the treaties. The U.S. Antiterrorism Act (ATA) under which plaintiffs sued in the 
cases discussed above provides civil remedies for “international terrorism” and 
includes under that heading offenses under section 2339C of the U.S. Code, which 
criminalizes financing terrorism.284 That code provision in turn implements U.S. 
obligations under the Financing Convention and defines the offense in terms that 
mirror the convention’s definition.285 
Simply put, if the argument is that one state’s law implementing international law 
can override another state’s national law that conflicts with international law so as to 
constitute a vertical conflict of laws between international and national law, the first 
state’s law actually must implement international law. That is, it must accurately 
incorporate international law and not expand it in new or idiosyncratic ways.286 This 
condition goes not only to the assent of other states to be bound by the precise 
international law at issue and the consequent legitimacy of enforcing that law but 
also to fairness to parties subject to the contradictory overlapping laws. For instance, 
the pure vertical conflicts jurisprudence is quick to point out that hardship to the 
parties is diluted where parties were on notice of the international legal norm being 
applied to them.287 But if national law—here, the U.S. law implementing the 
international norm—does not do so accurately, this notice argument disintegrates. 
A potential sticking point for the vertical conflicts theory articulated so far as 
applied to actual cases might be that many of the major international instruments and 
treaties prohibiting activities under international law tend to be couched in terms of 
public law enforcement. More specifically, they mostly proscribe the activity they 
regulate as criminal offenses and contemplate mutual legal assistance among 
states.288 Although courts in civil suits certainly textually qualify as arms of states, a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 284. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a) (2012). 
 285. Compare Financing Convention, supra note 281, at art. 2(1)(b), with 18 U.S.C. § 
2339C(a)(1)(B). See also Colangelo, supra note 282, at 195–99. 
 286. For a more detailed explanation of this point, see Anthony J. Colangelo, International 
Law in U.S. State Courts: Extraterritoriality and “False Conflicts” of Law, 48 INT’L LAW. 1, 
10–13 (2014). This requirement would obtain whether the domestic legal system is monist or 
dualist in nature. See id. 
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609, 613 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)); see also Strauss I, 242 F.R.D. 199, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss 
v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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civil cause of action of the sort contained in the ATA might be seen as going beyond 
the norm contained in the treaty by placing its enforcement, or at least the initiation 
thereof, in the hands of private parties as opposed to government actors.  
There are, however, counterarguments—frequently raised in ATS cases289—that 
even if the relevant international instruments prohibit an offense as a public law 
matter, civil cases alleging international law violations are still an acceptable way to 
enforce international law without doing violence to how international law is 
traditionally enforced. These counterarguments assert that international law itself 
generally does not care how its substantive norms are implemented via domestic 
legal apparatuses since that is a matter for a state’s internal, not international, law; 
that private international law has long held that domestic forum law provides 
procedures and remedies for the application of both foreign and international 
substantive law;290 and that as a domestic law matter, separation of powers and 
foreign affairs concerns about private parties as opposed to government actors 
bringing suit have presumably been resolved ex ante by the very creation of a 
statutory private enforcement mechanism (like the ATA) and what courts have 
deemed “private attorneys general,” or the private parties initiating proceedings.291 
In short, both public and private international law demonstrate a fairly robust history 
of leaving enforcement of substantive international norms to the processes of 
domestic legal systems. And the fact that governments authorize private parties in 
addition to their own agencies to enforce international law does not change the 
substance of that law; instead, it merely allocates resources so as to maximize 
enforcement. 
Nonetheless, for purposes of the vertical conflicts presently under discussion, any 
sticking point about public versus private enforcement of international law via civil 
suits is simply inapplicable. The key international instruments against financing 
terrorism explicitly contemplate private enforcement via civil proceedings. Article 5 
of the Financing Convention, for example, provides: 
Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles, 
shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located in its 
territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when a person 
responsible for the management or control of that legal entity has, in that 
capacity, committed an offence set forth in article 2. Such liability may 
be criminal, civil or administrative.292 
In sum, for the most prolific vertical conflicts of law presently arising in the cases, 
the relevant international instruments expressly contemplate civil actions and 
therefore erase objections that civil enforcement constitutes unacceptably parochial 
or idiosyncratic expansions of the international norm being enforced via domestic 
proceedings. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 289. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665–66 (2013). 
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Now that we know what absolute conflicts of law are, how they differ from and 
relate to other doctrines, their own myriad doctrinal manifestations, and the 
conceptual and procedural dynamics that attend those manifestations, we can start to 
craft mechanisms for resolving them. 
II. RESOLVING ABSOLUTE CONFLICTS 
The elementary concept I would like to employ in fashioning a mechanism for 
resolving absolute conflicts of law is the notion of the rule of law. By this, I mean 
simply “[t]he supremacy of regular as opposed to arbitrary power.”293 For some 
readers, the term “rule of law” may conjure an encyclopedic labyrinth of definitions 
and connotations from legal philosophy, constitutional theory, and popular culture. I 
hope to avoid entering that maze by using it in the core sense that law seeks “the 
objective of giving a meaningful direction to human effort,”294 to quote Lon Fuller. 
That is, I want to use it mainly in a functional and pragmatic way to describe those 
features of law that make it effective at shaping human behavior, features that tend 
toward predictability and stability and away from arbitrariness and anarchy. 
Fundamental to these features is that actors can fairly comply with the law. Why is 
this concept so important to our increasingly interconnected regulatory world? To 
quote a prominent trade scholar, the rule of law “suggests a degree of certainty and 
predictability, facilitating the economic transactions that ultimately provide our 
bread or tacos, internet connections, and data transmittal that increase peoples’ 
standards of living and make society better off.”295 Or in the words of a fairly recent 
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U.S. Court of Appeals decision addressing an absolute conflict of laws, in our “world 
[of] economic interdependence . . . international commerce depends to a large extent 
on ‘the ability of merchants to predict the likely consequences of their conduct in 
overseas markets.’”296 More broadly, Jeremy Waldron notes that “the whole point of 
the [rule of law] is to secure individual freedom by providing a predictable 
environment in which individuals can act freely, plan their affairs, and make their 
decisions.”297 
Yet the nature of an international system comprised of multiple autonomous or 
semiautonomous legal systems puts significant and perhaps impossible pressure on 
the notion of the rule of law. For the rule of law seems to assume the possibility of a 
system of rules that can be molded—implicit in which is some authority capable of 
doing the molding. It is therefore unsurprising that the rule of law often takes the 
form of directives or signposts to that authority, whether it is the imaginary ruler Rex 
in Fuller’s description of eight ways to fail to make law,298 or a new government 
trying to find its feet.299 The constitutional dilemma presented by the international 
system is that there is no authority, at least traditionally understood, to which these 
directives can be addressed.300 International law is a quintessentially bottom-up as 
opposed to a top-down lawmaking system. Take the rule of law criterion at the heart 
of this Article: avoidance of contradictory laws. If two laws fight each other in a 
domestic system, some ultimate authority can definitively resolve that battle. But in 
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individuals, not national governments, seems to me plainly correct. He appears to treat the 
issue mainly as going to the applicability of substantive international law, or what we might 
call public international law. See id. at 323. The absolute conflict scenario discussed in this 
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the international system, there is no definitive ultimate authority to which a rule of 
law directive against contradictory laws may be addressed. The contradiction may 
well resolve itself, but the resolution will not be the result of some overarching 
sovereign authority’s decision to obey the rule of law. Further compounding the 
dilemma is that each state’s own internal legal system has an equally powerful claim 
to the legitimacy of its own laws. Thus, what we might think of as an “international 
rule of law” necessarily and problematically raises a determinative predicate question 
about whether the notion of the rule of law can even apply in the first place to a 
singularly exceptional composite system of multiple coequal constituent legal 
systems with no overarching rulemaking authority. 
As my decision to use the rule of law probably gives away, I think it can apply to 
the international system. Nothing integral to the notion of supplying predictable and 
stable rules for legal actors requires a single overarching authority capable of 
molding those rules. They may develop in a decentralized and organic fashion. We 
have seen already that the frontline decision makers for resolving absolute conflicts 
so far have been courts. The very existence of the common law suggests that courts 
are capable of crafting rules that both strive toward and achieve a sufficient degree 
of coherence for the governance of human behavior.  
The confounding variable in the conflict of laws and private international law 
fields, of course, is that conflict of laws rules are a matter of each state’s internal 
law.301 As a result, different states may adopt different methodologies for resolving 
conflicts of law, and thus the question of which law will eventually govern a given 
multijurisdictional dispute hinges on where that case is initiated. As Part I detailed, 
the raw data thus far in the form of judicial decisions strongly indicates that courts 
presently weigh competing state interests, resulting in the jurisdiction where a case 
is initiated being the jurisdiction whose laws most likely will apply.302 Now, one 
might say that this in itself supplies a fairly predictable rule. But the problem is that 
transnational actors subject to multiple contradictory laws typically have no control 
over where cases against them are initiated, whether the cases are private lawsuits or 
public enforcement actions.303 Any precision this sort of rule provides is therefore ex 
post, not ex ante, to the crucial moment of deciding whether to engage in the 
transnational activity to begin with. Aside from obvious invitations to forum shop, it 
also decreases predictability and increases arbitrariness of the law. 
The most successful marriage between the rule of law and the field of conflict of 
laws in the international system would ask states and, in practice, courts, to adopt 
largely the same conflict of laws methodology and that the methodology be neutral, 
or fairly independent, of pro- or anti-forum bias. While this was tried without much 
success in the First Restatement of Conflict of Laws, that approach was based on a 
rigidly formalistic artifice of legal fictions that purported to resolve nearly all choice 
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of law issues through a series of a priori principles that “localized” multijurisdictional 
activity in a single jurisdiction based on a single point of contact.304 The rigidity of 
the rules in turn led to them being riddled with unpredictably applied exceptions, or 
“escape devices,”305 by courts—paradoxically leading to a breakdown in the rule of 
law and spawning what has been called a “choice of law revolution” led in part by 
Currie’s governmental interest analysis.306 
Far from the type of approach envisaged by the First Restatement, I want to 
advance for courts a more flexible multifactored test that focuses on fairness to 
parties, and I want to apply it to only one type of conflict of laws: absolute conflicts. 
Although a multifactored fairness standard may lead to different applications by 
different courts, two key assets recommend it over other approaches: it is the same 
across jurisdictions, and the test itself preferences party rights and fairness. As I will 
argue below, this fairness focus promises to create opportunities and mechanisms for 
parties subject to absolute conflicts or potential absolute conflicts to play a role in 
the resolution of those conflicts in favor of one law over the other. As to both the rule 
of law and the field of conflict of laws, it is probably most realistic and productive 
to talk about the law and what we would like it to achieve in terms of degrees. If the 
ultimate aim is predictability and stability for transnational actors subject to 
contradictory laws, a fairness test looks more attractive than prevailing alternatives 
that effectively locate the decision of what law will apply outside transnational 
actors’ control after they have acted. Also recommending a fairness test is that it is 
not brand new. It has both the wisdom and the luxury of drawing from factors courts 
have intuited and elaborated for decades, and simply reorients the focus of absolute 
conflicts analysis around these factors instead of raw state interests. Finally, at least 
in U.S. law, it is doctrinally anchored in Rogers’s use of the Due Process Clause to 
address absolute conflicts in the form of foreign sovereign compulsion.307 
The cases exhibit a number of fairness factors, the most salient of which grow 
directly out of Rogers, such as good faith in trying to comply with contradictory laws 
and the hardship parties likely will face as a result of the absolute conflict of laws. 
Courts have also developed other fairness factors that relate to and can be housed in 
these initial factors, including the reciprocity of bearing burdens commensurate with 
benefits received from a legal system; the party or nonparty status of the actor subject 
to the absolute conflict; notice that the party might be subject to the absolute conflict; 
and whether the absolute conflict was, in some way, of the party’s own making. 
Together these factors supply a fairly well-rounded approach to resolving absolute 
conflicts. Moreover, they may also capture the varying state interests at play in a 
given absolute conflict case in a more nuanced way than prevailing state interest 
methodologies. For instance, good faith efforts to comply with contradictory laws 
may be met with waiver of the law or accommodation by the interested states, 
revealing a more accurate picture of the strength of those states’ interests; similarly, 
the hardships parties will face resulting from the absolute conflict provide a faithful 
representation of the relative strengths of the conflicting state interests based on a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 304. SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES & WENDY COLLINS PERDUE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 49 (3d ed. 2012) (describing conflict localization). 
 305. Id. 
 306. See Symeonides, supra note 45, at 34–35. 
 307. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 209 (1958).  
770 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 91:719 
 
detailed assessment of the nature of the law itself, the likelihood of enforcement, and 
the existence and likelihood of success of potential defenses. After describing these 
factors, the Article concludes by suggesting that they can lead to better outcomes. 
A. Good Faith 
Good faith can enter into absolute conflict analyses at multiple stages. It can 
constitute an almost preliminary determination about whether the absolute conflict 
of laws to which a party is subject is or is not of the party’s own making. And it can 
factor into determining whether a party actually tried to comply with the conflicting 
laws in good faith and was in fact unable to do so. Moreover, courts have employed 
these good faith considerations both when determining whether to subject a party to 
an absolute conflict by applying forum law in the first place and, if forum law does 
apply to create an absolute conflict, when determining the appropriate sanctions for 
noncompliance with forum law. 
1. No Courting Legal Impediments 
Rogers again provides a fruitful starting point. To begin with, the Supreme Court 
considered and rejected as unsupported by the record the government’s “suggest[ion] 
that petitioner stands in the position of one who deliberately courted legal 
impediments” to compliance with U.S. law, “and who thus cannot now be heard to 
assert its good faith after this expectation was realized.”308 However, the Court 
explained that “[c]ertainly these contentions, if supported by the facts, would have a 
vital bearing on justification for dismissal of the action, but they are not open to the 
Government here.”309 In short, a party cannot claim a good faith inability to comply 
with contradictory laws if the contradictory law was in some way procured by the 
party. The fact that the absolute conflict in Rogers was not of the party’s making was 
an important factor that “compel[led] the conclusion on this record that . . . failure to 
satisfy fully the requirements of this production order was due to inability fostered 
neither by [the party’s] own conduct nor by circumstances within its control.”310  
Although Rogers is a mixed absolute conflict case, this rule is consistent with 
courts’ treatment of substantive absolute conflicts as well. The court in 
Interamerican Refining Corporation, for example, excused the operation of U.S. 
antitrust law because undisputed evidence showed that “defendants were compelled 
by regulatory authorities in Venezuela to boycott plaintiff” and “[n]othing in the 
materials before the Court indicates that defendants either procured the Venezuelan 
order or that they acted voluntarily pursuant to a delegation of authority to control 
the oil industry.”311 That is, “defendants complied in good faith with Venezuelan 
regulatory authorities. There is no evidence that the compulsion was sought or 
induced by the defendants and there is undisputed evidence to the contrary.”312 
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Indeed, the evidence demonstrated that “defendants were eager to sell to plaintiff,” 
and did so “in good faith before and after the ban.”313 
2. Extensive Efforts at Compliance 
The other important factor for the Court in Rogers was “petitioner’s extensive 
efforts at compliance” with the discovery order, the combination of which led to the 
conclusion “that failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, 
bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.”314 Good faith efforts at compliance thus may 
constitute an additional requirement on top of not procuring or “court[ing] legal 
impediments” in the form of absolute conflicts of law.315 For the Court in Rogers, 
this combination of good faith helped invalidate the lower court’s dismissal of the 
case against the petitioner under the Due Process Clause.316 Yet as noted in Part I, 
the Court did not free the petitioner from the absolute conflict of laws altogether; the 
U.S. discovery order still applied.317 Rather, the party’s good faith helped mitigate 
the potential sanctions constitutionally available for failing to comply with forum 
law.318 
3. At Both the Order and the Sanctions Stage 
Some lower courts have extended Rogers in procedural and mixed absolute 
conflict cases to the antecedent determination of whether forum law even applies to 
create the absolute conflict in the first place. These courts have used good faith both 
when determining whether to apply forum law to create the absolute conflict and, 
like Rogers, when determining sanctions.319 As with much of the law in this area, the 
progenitor of these developments was the Second Circuit,320 though other courts have 
shown a similar willingness to refuse to order initial discovery.321 As the Southern 
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District of New York in Minpeco observed, “[c]ourts in this circuit have considered 
a resisting party’s good faith efforts to comply with discovery at the order stage as 
well as the sanctions stage,” including “whether a party’s inability to produce 
documents as a result of foreign law prohibitions was fostered by its own conduct 
prior to the commencement of the litigation.”322  
For example, the district court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena explained that “[a]n 
affirmative showing of good faith is required at the order stage” and found that in the 
FCPA case before it the U.S. corporation “has ‘courted legal impediments’ and does 
not appear to have genuinely attempted to comply” with U.S. law,323 which, along 
with other factors, led the court to grant the government’s motion to compel 
discovery.324 More specifically, the corporation had repeatedly “sought advice from 
the [foreign] Ministry of Justice intended to elicit support for resisting anticipated 
subpoenas from the grand jury” through communications that, among other things, 
“suggest[ed] bases for noncompliance, including whether the documents belong to 
the Corporation or the Republic under the Republic’s law, what jurisdiction the 
government maintains over them, and what ‘limitations’ exist under the Republic’s 
law that would prohibit transmission of the documents out of the country.”325 In 
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, the district court similarly stressed that under Rogers, 
a “party’s good or bad faith is a vital factor,” and found that the bank had 
“deliberately courted legal impediments” and “acted in bad faith” by purposefully 
hiding behind Swiss nondisclosure law to “evade . . . the strictures of American 
securities law against insider trading,”326 powerfully contributing to the court’s 
decision to compel disclosure.327 
On the other hand, perhaps the strongest example of good faith factoring into an 
absolute conflict analysis in a party’s favor is the Tenth Circuit’s decision in In re 
Westinghouse, discussed earlier,328 in which a U.S. corporation headquartered in 
Canada and its president were held in civil contempt for failing to comply with a U.S. 
discovery order.329 The company, Rio Algom, and its president argued that to comply 
with the order would invariably expose them to criminal liability under Canadian 
uranium and atomic energy laws.330 The record revealed that the Canadian courts had 
already roundly dismissed letters rogatory to obtain the information requested in the 
U.S. proceedings on the grounds that to do so would violate Canadian law and public 
policy, and that Rio Algom also had formally requested permission from the 
Canadian government to release the information and that Canadian government 
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agencies, like the courts, had firmly rejected the request.331 The court found that “Rio 
Algom has made diligent effort to produce materials not subject to the Canadian 
regulation” and sought permission to disclose materials subject to regulation from 
the Canadian authorities “in the best of faith.”332 In making these findings, the court 
explained, “[t]here is nothing in the record which would indicate that Rio Algom 
. . . ‘ran’ to Canada as this controversy was developing in order to gain the protection 
of Canadian law”; nor had Rio Algom “in some manner caused the nondisclosure 
regulation to be promulgated in Canada in order to cover up its activities or that Rio 
Algom and the Canadian Government acted in collusion.”333 This good faith played 
a dominant role in the court’s decision to vacate the district court’s contempt order 
and associated sanctions.334  
4. Defining Good Faith 
All of the above raises an integrally important question about good faith for an 
absolute conflict analysis: What kinds of steps satisfy, or should satisfy, the 
definition of good faith?  
a. Bad Faith 
As with any difficult definitional question, one place to start is by defining what 
is not good faith. Here the court’s discussion in In re Grand Jury Subpoena can be 
instructive.335 The court found that the corporation suspected of foreign corrupt 
practices actively solicited from foreign officials legal impediments to anticipated 
U.S. proceedings—including by suggesting possible legal restrictions to the foreign 
officials—instead of trying to foster cooperation with the foreign government.336 
That type of activity certainly seems to fall within Rogers’s definition of “court[ing] 
legal impediments to production,” and accordingly qualifies as bad faith.337 A similar 
finding was made by the district court in Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC.338 Despite the 
bank’s professions of good faith in the form of letters to foreign banking authorities 
purporting to request permission to disclose information protected by foreign bank 
secrecy laws, the court found that “the letters were calculated to fail” because they 
“represented . . . that plaintiffs’ allegations have ‘no basis in reality or in the law’” 
and inaccurately “stated that the [U.S.] court had ‘provided for respecting 
confidentiality laws in the countries of the[] accounts” when the court had made no 
such provision, leading to the ultimate finding that the bank’s “false or exaggerated 
assertions hardly support a finding of good faith.”339  
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As to the defendant bank’s efforts to comply, the court underscored that the bank 
could not in good faith “claim[] credit” for its productions to date because those 
productions had come only after the court had ordered them,340 a finding other 
decisions have made as well.341 Finally, “years of delay caused by defendant’s 
refusals to produce weigh against a finding of good faith” as did the defendant’s 
“selective compliance with foreign bank secrecy laws.”342 In all, soliciting foreign 
legal impediments, years-long dilatory tactics, and selective compliance with the 
foreign law purporting to prohibit production all point toward bad faith.  
b. An Affirmative Showing 
Now that we have an idea of what bad faith looks like, we can move to more 
neutral ground and begin to approach good faith. As the quoted language from In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena suggests, courts that have considered the issue generally 
require “[a]n affirmative showing of good faith.”343 And the cases hold that it is up 
to the party alleging noncompliance due to foreign law to make this showing. Thus 
in rejecting a Chinese corporation’s claims that production would violate Chinese 
law, the Ninth Circuit in Richmark Corp. v. Timber Lane Falling Consultants 
explained that a party claiming that foreign law prohibited production was “required 
. . . to make an affirmative showing of its good faith in seeking permission to disclose 
the information,” and upheld the lower court’s sanctions because the corporation 
“has made no such affirmative showing here.”344 Similarly, in Dexia Credit Local v. 
Rogan, the court faulted the defendants, who claimed Belize law prohibited them 
from producing documents, for failing to seek “an order of the Belize courts 
specifically authorizing them to disclose the trust information.”345 According to the 
court, “[t]he failure . . . to take good faith steps to avoid a conflict with Belize law 
weighs against relaxing their obligations under United States law.”346 In short, a party 
intending to rely on an absolute conflict with foreign law as an excuse for 
noncompliance with U.S. law does nothing at its peril. The cases demonstrate that, 
at the very least, the party must take steps to be excused from the foreign law in order 
to make “[a]n affirmative showing of good faith.”347 
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c. Showing Efforts to Comply 
As to efforts toward compliance, Rogers itself supplies fairly ample argument that 
disclosing the universe of relevant materials not covered by the foreign law 
prohibition goes far toward establishing “extensive efforts at compliance,”348 as well 
as continuing efforts to secure waivers and permissions from foreign authorities.349 
In re Westinghouse similarly confirms that “diligent effort to produce materials not 
subject” to the foreign law prohibition in addition to “s[eeking] a waiver” from the 
foreign authorities under foreign law exhibits good faith.350 
d. Not Evading U.S. Law 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the good faith analysis remains, however, and 
involves whether the party subject to the absolute conflict purposefully used foreign 
law to “evade . . . the strictures of American . . . law,”351 as the court in Banca Della 
Svizzera Italiana put it. Unlike the other, more objective aspects of the good faith 
analysis—either the record shows good faith attempts to obtain waivers or it does 
not, either there was extensive production of nonprohibited materials or there was 
not—this involves a highly subjective aspect. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana suggests 
that reliance on foreign bank secrecy law to hide what looks like a clear violation of 
U.S. substantive law—there, U.S. law against insider trading—is itself evasive and 
cannot qualify as good faith.352 And Minpeco indicates that some level of advance 
planning to comply with U.S. law may be required, for instance seeking waivers of 
foreign privacy laws before entering into U.S. markets.353 On the other hand, In re 
Westinghouse seemed to take a more sanguine approach to the party’s failure to 
comply as a result of foreign law, noting that nothing in the record “indicate[d] that 
Rio Algom or its president ‘ran’ to Canada as this controversy was developing in 
order to gain the protection of Canadian law.”354 
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Although more subjective and flexible than the other good faith components, a 
number of considerations appear to factor into this good faith analysis. One is the 
type of foreign law at issue. In line with the distinction drawn in Part I,355 the more 
procedural the foreign law looks, the less deference it is given; the more substantive 
the law looks, the more deference it is given in a good faith analysis. Even though 
Minpeco ultimately found against good faith, it noted that weighing against bad faith 
was “that this is not a situation in which the party resisting discovery has relied on a 
sham law such as a blocking statute to refuse disclosure.”356 By contrast, the court in 
In re Westinghouse found that the Canadian laws at issue there captured profound 
substantive policies—quoting the law—“to control and supervise the development, 
application and use of atomic energy.”357 Also relevant to judicial analysis of good 
faith on this front may be how long the foreign law has been in effect. If the law 
appears to have been enacted in close chronological proximity to the dispute, courts 
may view it less favorably in terms of good faith. If, on the other hand, it is part of a 
longstanding policy in the foreign nation, courts are more disposed to find good 
faith.358 Finally, a good faith finding may turn somewhat on the absolute conflict 
determination at issue. Courts appear more stringent in their requirements and to 
require a higher threshold of affirmative good faith conduct when deciding whether 
to order compliance with U.S. law in the first place as opposed to when determining 
sanctions for noncompliance.359 
In sum, courts have developed a number of factors for discerning good faith in an 
absolute conflict of laws analysis, including whether the party in some way procured 
the absolute conflict and whether the party tried to get permission or waivers 
excusing the operation of foreign law. As to mixed and procedural absolute conflicts, 
courts also consider whether the party complied to the fullest extent feasible with a 
U.S. discovery order and whether the party purposefully used foreign law to evade 
U.S. law—with the latter factor containing a number of possible subfactors like what 
type of foreign law is at issue, the timing of the law’s enactment, and whether the 
absolute conflict analysis is at the order stage or the sanctions stage. Like any fairness 
test, this may seem vague, but it is not vacuous. These factors provide concrete 
guidance to courts for measuring a party’s good faith when subjected to an absolute 
conflict or potential absolute conflict of laws, and helpful markers for placing the 
party’s conduct on a “continuum of fault,” as one court described it.360 It is also 
important to recall that good faith is but one of multiple fairness elements and that 
“notwithstanding [a litigant’s] good faith, [the court is] not precluded from” 
subjecting parties to absolute conflicts of law, particularly in mixed and procedural 
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absolute conflicts cases.361 The other major fairness element courts have developed 
and relied upon is the hardship parties likely will face if subjected to an absolute 
conflict of laws—to which we now turn. 
B. Hardship 
As with good faith, hardship also stems from the Supreme Court’s opinion in 
Rogers.362 According to the Court, “[i]t is hardly debatable that fear of criminal 
prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse” for noncompliance with U.S. law, “and 
this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing compliance are those of a 
foreign sovereign.”363 The Court was careful to distinguish this type of absolute 
conflict situation “from one where a party claims that compliance with a court’s order 
will reveal facts which may provide the basis for criminal prosecution of that party 
under the penal laws of a foreign sovereign thereby shown to have been violated.”364 
Rather, it was imperative “that the very fact of compliance by disclosure of banking 
records [pursuant to U.S. law] will itself constitute the initial violation of Swiss 
laws.”365 Thus, and as with substantive absolute conflicts,366 there is an initial 
requirement that there actually be an absolute conflict of laws.  
Also, like good faith, the hardship factor contains a number of subinquiries, most 
prominently: the likelihood that the foreign law will be enforced—evidenced by, for 
example, the nature of the foreign law; the foreign government’s statements and 
responses to the U.S. proceedings; whether the law has been enforced in the past; 
and the availability and likelihood of successful defenses under foreign law. The 
subinquiries further divide into whether the foreign law is criminal or civil, statutory 
or judge-made; the status of the party in relation to the litigation; taking on burdens 
commensurate with the party’s availment of U.S. law and the U.S. legal system; 
whether the party was on notice of the hardship; and whether the party’s claimed 
hardship was of its own making, all of which will be explored below. 
Before delving into these, however, I want to mention at the outset that Rogers 
also alluded to another type of hardship when it noted, “[t]his is not to say that 
petitioner will profit through its inability to tender the records called for” and hinted 
that sanctions less severe than dismissal, like an adverse inference at trial, might be 
justifiable because “[i]t may be that in a trial on the merits, petitioner’s inability to 
produce specific information will prove a serious handicap in dispelling doubt the 
Government might be able to inject into the case.”367 If the Due Process Clause 
protects the procedural rights of parties subject to an absolute conflict of laws, it also 
protects the procedural rights of parties seeking to enforce—and especially parties 
seeking to enforce their own rights under—U.S. law. In this connection, 
litigation-related factors that courts have developed, and that the restatements have 
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adopted, like the importance of the requested material to the litigation368 and the 
availability of alternative means of securing the information,369 may be housed under 
the hardship factor but weigh the hardship to the other party to the litigation, not to 
the party subject to the absolute conflict. Indeed these factors underpin 
mirror-reflection rule of law values that allow the state to do its job for the benefit of 
everyone else. For it is both inaccurate and crude to think of the state as simply “a 
ferocious evil in people’s lives that needs constraining;” rather, the state “can also be 
a force for domestic peace, for equality, and for a generally high level of social 
wellbeing, precisely by virtue of ensuring, through lawful process, that the state 
successfully monopolize the use of force and by being a generally equalizing 
participant in the battle over the allocation of private power.”370 The rule of law ought 
to respect and counter-value these functions as well.  
1. Hardship to the Party Subject to the Absolute Conflict 
As noted, when gauging hardship to the party subject to the absolute conflict, 
courts evaluate a number of sub-factors such as the likelihood that foreign law will 
be enforced; whether foreign law is criminal or civil, statutory or judge-made; the 
status of the party to the litigation; and, more innovatively, the reciprocity of bearing 
burdens commensurate to the benefits received from U.S. law and the U.S. legal 
system; whether the party was on notice of the potential hardship when it acted; and 
whether the alleged hardship was of the party’s own making. 
a. Likelihood of Enforcement 
The likelihood that foreign law will be enforced can be further broken down into 
a number of sub-sub-factors, which may or may not be present on the facts of a given 
case. For instance, courts may look to the type of law at issue: Is it a purely procedural 
law directed at blocking U.S. discovery that was never really intended to be enforced 
(i.e., a “blocking statute”), in which case it is afforded little deference? Or does it 
capture an authentic substantive policy actually intended to be enforced, in which 
case it is accorded more deference? In addition, has the foreign government indicated 
that the law will be enforced, has the law been enforced in the past, and are there 
potential defenses under foreign law with a likelihood of success? 
i. Procedure Versus Substance (Again) 
Consistent with other facets of the law of absolute conflicts,371 courts assessing 
hardship accord substantially less weight to a foreign law that is purely procedural in 
nature and that is designed only to block U.S. discovery with no threat of actual 
enforcement. In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, for example, 
explained that “a number of courts have discounted this hardship when considering the 
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French blocking statute,”372 because the foreign law does not subject parties “to a 
realistic risk of prosecution.”373 Here, courts have looked not only at the statute but also 
to its legislative history.374 Courts have contrasted pure blocking statutes with statutes 
that capture an authentic foreign policy that foreign states genuinely intend to enforce. 
Thus in Minpeco, the court found that the Swiss Penal Code provisions protecting bank 
secrecy not only imposed a “substantial fine” and “incarceration,” but also that—unlike 
with the French blocking statute—no argument could be made that the bank and its 
employees “face no real threat of prosecution.”375 The court in SEC v. Stanford 
International Bank, Ltd., came to a similar conclusion, pointing out “Switzerland’s 
historical interest in promoting privacy in the bank-customer relationship” and 
emphasizing—unlike with the French foreign blocking statute—“the absence of any 
evidence suggesting that Switzerland crafted its laws specifically to impede United 
States courts’ discovery orders.”376 
ii. Foreign Government Action 
Courts evaluating the likelihood that foreign law will be enforced also consider 
actions of the foreign government in seeking to enforce, and enforcing in the past, 
the foreign law at issue. For instance, the Second Circuit in First National City Bank 
observed that “when foreign governments, including Germany, have considered their 
vital national interests threatened, they have not hesitated to make known their 
objections to the enforcement of [U.S. law],” but that the German government in the 
case before it had not “expressed any view on this case or indicated that, under the 
circumstances present[ed],” German law and policy would be violated by enforcing 
U.S. law.377 Strauss I and Strauss II also supply good examples and once again deal 
with the French blocking statute. Strauss I noted that “the French government has 
failed to submit any objections” to the enforcement of U.S. law and that “[g]laringly 
absent from the submission by Credit Lyonnais is any indication that civil or criminal 
prosecutions by the French government or civil suits by [the bank’s clients] are 
likely, rather than mere possibilities.”378 Strauss II confirmed that “the [French] bank 
has failed to demonstrate that either [the bank’s clients] or the French government 
would likely seek to prosecute or otherwise sanction Credit Lyonnais for complying” 
with U.S. law.379 Other courts to have examined the statute similarly have found that 
“[t]here is little evidence that the statute has been or will be enforced.”380 
Indeed, in the Strauss cases the bank had already disclosed some protected 
information and had faced no legal consequences under French law for those 
disclosures, thereby undermining its argument that “such hardship is either imminent 
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or inevitable.”381 Similarly, in Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., the court found 
unpersuasive the bank’s protests of likely hardship, observing that the bank “has 
apparently never been sanctioned by the Chinese government for complying with 
American court orders to produce documents in contravention of China’s bank 
secrecy laws.”382 Even though the bank had previously complied with such orders, it 
had received no sanction other than a “‘severe warning’ from Chinese banking 
regulators.”383 And the court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena appears simply to have 
concluded that the foreign government and the U.S. corporation alleged to have 
engaged in foreign corrupt practices were colluding and, in light of such collusion, 
neither had adequately “presented any evidence that the confidentiality asserted by 
the Republic is enforced by any active prosecution.”384 
By contrast, where the evidence showed a real threat of foreign enforcement, 
courts have been far less inclined to impose U.S. law.385 Probably the best example 
is Reinsurance Company of America, Inc., v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat.386 
The Seventh Circuit found that Romanian state secrets law prohibiting disclosure 
was “vigorously enforced” and that those who complied with U.S. law would face a 
“very real threat” of being “subject to the criminal sanctions of the law protecting 
state secrets.”387 Given the equally legitimate but competing U.S. and Romanian 
interests, the court held that “the potential hardship to [the party subject to the 
potential absolute conflict] tipped the balance against asserting [U.S.] 
jurisdiction.”388  
iii. Potential Defenses 
Courts have also been willing to look more closely at foreign law in order to 
determine the likelihood that a case will result in liability if it is in fact brought to 
enforce the foreign law.389 Thus in Dexia Credit Local, the court examined the Belize 
Trusts Act that the defendants claimed would be violated if they complied with U.S. 
law.390 Upon inspection, the court concluded that even if U.S. law were applied, it 
was unclear that it would create liability because, on at least one interpretation, it 
could apply “without any conflict between United States and Belize law.”391 
The most salient consideration in this analysis of foreign law is the existence and 
likelihood of success of potential defenses. Weiss v. National Westminster Bank is 
illustrative.392 The court found that the bank “has demonstrated that British bank 
secrecy laws are actually enforced” but failed to demonstrate any real risk of 
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enforcement in its own case and, importantly, that even if the law were enforced, the 
bank “will have a valid defense” under British law.393 But the evidence must actually 
show a valid defense for courts to conclude that the potential defense reduces the 
likelihood of enforcement. In Weiss, that evidence took the form of both the British 
law itself and an expert opinion on the law and its exceptions.394 By contrast, in 
Minpeco the court determined that the evidence showed “the likelihood of a 
successful defense to a Swiss prosecution based on [Swiss Law] is highly speculative 
in the circumstances of these cases.”395 To be sure, reading closely the law and the 
expert opinions, the court concluded “that not even plaintiffs’ experts would predict 
the success of these defenses in the circumstances of these cases.”396 Accordingly, 
while courts are willing to look to foreign law, including potential defenses, in 
assessing whether the law is likely to be successfully enforced, evidence must 
demonstrate that any defenses under foreign law are valid and likely to be successful 
in the circumstances of the case for courts to use them to discount the likelihood of 
enforcement. This evidence typically takes the form of not just the foreign law but 
also expert opinion on that law.  
b. Characteristics of the Foreign Law 
Apart from the likelihood of enforcement inquiry, courts also inquire into the 
characteristics of foreign law creating or potentially creating absolute conflicts with 
U.S. law. Unsurprisingly given Rogers’s statement that “fear of criminal prosecution 
constitutes a weighty excuse” for noncompliance with U.S. law,397 if the foreign law 
is a criminal law, courts are more inclined to view it as creating hardship.398 Yet 
while the criminal character of a foreign law can certainly help parties subject to the 
law argue hardship, that a foreign law is instead civil or administrative in character 
may not necessarily hurt parties alleging hardship. While some courts have used the 
civil character of a foreign law to downplay hardship,399 others have adopted the view 
“that a sharp dichotomy between criminal and civil penalties is an imprecise means 
of measuring the hardship for requiring compliance with” U.S. law400 and have been 
willing to interpret foreign civil penalties—especially those that might look criminal 
under U.S. law—as satisfying the hardship component.401  
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(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (same) (collecting cases). 
 399. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir. 
1983); Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 546 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 400. United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 401. See, e.g., Application of Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962). 
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Along the lines of the criminal versus civil distinction, courts also may look to 
whether the foreign law is statutory or judge-made, as well as the law’s purpose, in 
assessing hardship. The Second Circuit in First National City Bank, for instance, 
found significant that the German bank secrecy law at issue there “was not part of 
the statutory law of Germany; rather, it was in the nature of a privilege that could be 
waived by the customer but not the bank.”402 The judge-made character of the law 
seemed to water down the potential hardship in the court’s eyes, and the law’s 
protection for private parties, not the state, put it on the private as opposed to the 
public side of the public/private divide, dampening expected hardship because the 
penalties were likely less penal in nature.403 Also of significance was that the law 
could be waived by the bank’s clients,404 a feature that other courts have picked up 
on, and that, as in the good faith analysis above, courts have treated as imposing a 
sort of obligation on the party subject to foreign law to seek waiver. I address this 
waiver obligation below when analyzing whether the hardship resulted in any way 
from the party’s own actions.405 
c. Party Status 
Another, and sometimes critical, component in the hardship calculus is whether 
the party subject to the potential absolute conflict is a party to the primary litigation 
or instead has the status of a nonparty witness absent a satellite discovery issue. In 
short, the farther away from the primary litigation a party is, the more hardship courts 
are willing to find. Indeed, hardship to a party sufficiently removed from the central 
litigation can be dispositive. Probably the best example here is the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion in First National Bank of Chicago.406 The Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court’s order compelling disclosure of information under U.S. law in light of 
contrary Greek bank secrecy laws principally because those who would have been 
forced to comply with U.S. law in violation of Greek law in Greece were not parties 
to the main litigation.407 The Seventh Circuit explained: “We think it significant in 
weighing the hardship factor that the bank employees who would be exposed to 
penalty and First Chicago, which would be ordering its Greek employees to act 
unlawfully, are involved only as neutral sources of information and not as taxpayers 
or adverse parties in litigation.”408 All other things being equal for the court—both 
the United States and Greece had equally legitimate state interests—hardship to a 
nonparty to the central litigation yet potentially subject to an absolute conflict 
weighted the scale against applying U.S. law compelling disclosure.409 Other courts 
have similarly focused on the nonparty status of the person or entity subject to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 402. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d at 899. 
 403. See id. at 903. 
 404. Id.  
 405. See infra Part II.B.1.e. 
 406. United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 407. Id. at 346. The court did, however, direct the district court “to conduct further inquiry 
. . . to consider whether to issue an order requiring First Chicago to make a good faith effort 
to receive permission from the Greek authorities to produce the information.” Id. 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. 
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potential absolute conflict of laws in the hardship analysis.410 Even if the answer was 
not always dispositive in determining whether to apply U.S. law to create an absolute 
conflict, it still weighed heavily in determining hardship.411  
Moreover, as the Minpeco court astutely observed, in addition to practical 
problems with enforcing U.S. law against a nonparty, there may also be inequities in 
punishing a party removed from the U.S. proceedings.412 The court explained that 
typical sanctions like an adverse inference, or preclusion from presenting certain 
evidence at trial, or even a default judgment, would be unavailable.413 Instead, the 
only response to a nonparty’s noncompliance that the court felt would be available 
to it was contempt and the imposition of a fine substantial enough to be coercive.414 
But, as the court pointed out, “such a sanction—threatening a witness in a lawsuit 
with conflicting punitive measures by two sovereigns—would be disproportionate 
under the circumstances and excessively harmful to international comity.”415 
d. Reciprocity 
Courts have also expanded the hardship criterion to include less concrete inquiries 
that nonetheless carry strong jurisprudential backing from other areas of law that use 
fairness to gauge the exercise of jurisdiction. For example, a number of courts have 
used reciprocity-type arguments similar to what one sees in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence gauging the exercise of a state’s personal jurisdiction over a 
defendant.416 The basic rationale is that by enjoying the benefits of the forum and its 
laws, a party also must submit to commensurate legal burdens.417 One of the best 
illustrations of this reasoning comes from the Delaware Chancery Court in In re 
                                                                                                                 
 
 410. See, e.g., SEC v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 340 (N.D. Tex. 2011) 
(“SG Suisse is not a party to this action. And, the fact that the Stanford Defendants used their 
SG Suisse accounts to facilitate their scheme does not transform SG Suisse into a culpable 
party absent evidence of its complicity. Thus, this portion of the hardship analysis also weighs 
in SG Suisse’s favor.”); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 530 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“[A]lthough not decisive in itself, it cannot be ignored that BPS is no longer 
a primary defendant in these cases, a reality which further removes its nondefendant trading 
customers—the individuals and entities whose business secrets would be revealed—from the 
litigations.”). 
 411. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d at 340. 
 412. Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 530. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. Id. 
 416. The personal jurisdiction analysis applies differently to plaintiffs and requires only 
a minimum baseline of “notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the 
litigation, whether in person or through counsel.” Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 
797, 811–12 (1985). 
 417. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (“[T]o the extent that a 
corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits 
and protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to 
obligations, and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities 
within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to 
enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.”). 
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Activision Blizzard, Inc.418 The defendants were corporate directors of a Delaware 
corporation headquartered in California whose stock was listed on a U.S. 
exchange.419 Rejecting the defendants’ objections to discovery based on the French 
blocking statute, the court reasoned: 
each of the [defendants] submitted to the jurisdiction of the Delaware 
courts when they agreed to be an Activision director. By submitting to 
the jurisdiction of the Delaware courts, those individuals consented to 
the methods used by the Delaware courts for conducting and deciding 
litigation, including the processes for discovery under the Delaware 
rules.420 
To be sure, further strengthening this reciprocity rationale was that the corporation 
“has chosen previously to sue in the United States to take advantage of the greater 
access to evidence provided by American-style discovery.”421 And, in so doing, the 
corporation had disregarded the very French law it was invoking.422 In the court’s 
view, the corporation’s “prior decisions to disregard the Blocking Statute when 
advantageous undercut its ability to invoke the Blocking Statute now, when the shoe 
is on the other foot.”423 It was only fair, according to the court, that the defendants 
bear burdens reciprocal the benefits they availed themselves of under U.S. law.424 
This reciprocity rationale surfaces repeatedly throughout the case law. Early on, 
for instance, the Second Circuit in First National City Bank relied upon “the need to 
‘surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom’ or, 
alternatively a willingness to accept the consequences” in rejecting the defendant’s 
objections to the application of U.S. law on the grounds that it absolutely conflicted 
with German law.425 Similarly, the court in Banca Della Svizzera Italiana sought “to 
bring home the obligations a foreign entity undertakes when it conducts business on 
the American securities exchanges” by demanding disclosure under U.S. discovery 
rules.426 And the court in In re Grand Jury Subpoena cast the reciprocity rationale in 
assumption of risk terms, noting that “hardship [is] mitigated . . . to some extent 
[because] businesses that ‘serve two sovereigns’ assume the risk of conflicting legal 
imperatives.”427 
Even courts that ended up deciding not to compel the application of U.S. law so 
as not to create an absolute conflict with foreign law have acknowledged the 
reciprocity rationale. In re Westinghouse, for instance, recognized that the party from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 418. 86 A.3d 531 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
 419. Id. at 533. 
 420. Id. at 548–49 (citation omitted). 
 421. Id. at 549. 
 422. Id. at 550. 
 423. Id. 
 424. See id. 
 425. United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 905 (2d Cir. 1968) (quoting First 
Nat’l City Bank of N.Y. v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1959)).  
 426. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 427. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Aug. 9, 2000, 218 F. Supp. 2d 544, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (quoting United States v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 584 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)). 
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whom discovery was requested “is a Delaware corporation doing business in Utah 
and hence enjoys the benefits and privileges afforded by the United States,” which 
in turn opened up the argument that “it is only proper that [the corporation] be 
compelled to comply” with U.S. law.428 Finding this rationale only “superficially 
appealing” in light of the Canadian contacts at play—in particular, the physical 
location of the requested information in Canada—the Tenth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s contempt order and sanctions against the corporation for failing to 
comply with the discovery request.429 While in some tension with the majority of 
courts’ use of the reciprocity rationale to dilute hardship, the decision also confirms 
reciprocity’s place in the analysis. Overall, the more a party avails itself of the forum 
and its laws, the more inclined courts will feel to impose reciprocal burdens under 
those laws on a paradigmatic fairness rationale that also appears in other judicial 
evaluations of jurisdiction. 
e. Notice and the Party’s Own Making 
The final two hardship features go hand-in-hand both conceptually and in the 
cases, so I group them together here, too. They evaluate the degree of notice a party 
had of the absolute conflict and whether the hardship resulting from an absolute 
conflict was of the party’s own making. I put the notice consideration first in the 
sequence because it oftentimes constitutes a precursor to determining whether the 
absolute conflict was of the party’s own making by imputing to parties knowledge 
of, and some requirement to avoid ex ante, the conflict. Put another way, if a party 
had ample notice that an absolute conflict might apply to it so as to create hardship, 
and there were obvious ways to try to resolve or avoid the conflict and the party did 
not attempt them, but instead barreled ahead either blindly, knowingly, or 
purposefully into the conflict, courts may find that the party helped contribute to its 
own hardship. 
Yet before getting there, I should note that notice alone also may operate to reduce 
hardship. As the end of the vertical conflicts section hinted,430 courts dealing with 
international legal norms that absolutely conflict with parochial national laws have 
found that parties trapped between the two laws were on notice that they were subject 
to the overriding international law, and this notice functioned to reduce the party’s 
anticipated hardship. The Strauss cases, for example, emphasized under the hardship 
heading that international instruments prohibiting financing terrorism to which 
France was a party “warned financial institutions” that doing business with “‘high 
risk’ customers such as charities collecting funds related to terrorist activities” could 
expose those institutions “‘to significant reputational, operational and legal risk.’”431 
The court in Weiss made an almost identical finding with respect to the British bank 
attempting to use British bank secrecy law to resist disclosing information in a case 
                                                                                                                 
 
 428. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 999 (10th 
Cir. 1977). 
 429. Id. 
 430. See supra note 287 and accompanying text. 
 431. Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A. (Strauss I), 242 F.R.D. 199, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(quoting Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank PLC, 453 F. Supp. 2d 609, 619 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)); 
see also Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A. (Strauss II), 249 F.R.D. 429, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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alleging financing terrorism.432 In all of these vertical conflicts cases, notice itself of 
the overriding international law diluted the party’s hardship in the court’s analysis.433 
Notice of a looming absolute conflict and, more particularly, of potential ways 
around the conflict, may also reduce hardship if the party did not try to use available 
means to avoid the conflict in the first place. Somewhat similar to the good faith 
requirement of showing affirmative efforts to comply by obtaining permission from 
foreign governments,434 courts may construe a failure to adequately seek avoidance 
of the conflict as the party itself contributing in some way to the conflict, in turn 
weakening the claimed hardship resulting from the (potentially avoidable) conflict. 
Though instead of the foreign government, here it is usually other private parties that 
hold the keys to releasing the party from the absolute conflict. Thus in Banca Della 
Svizzera Italiana, the court explained that the bank secrecy privilege belonged not to 
the state but to “bank customers and may be waived by them. It is not something 
required to protect the Swiss government itself or some other public interest.”435 
Likewise, after explaining that Swiss banking law protects—and may be waived 
by—bank customers, Minpeco suggested that the bank “should have required its 
brokerage customers to execute waivers of their bank secrecy rights as a condition to 
trading on U.S. markets.”436 And in Dexia Credit, where the party interposed a fairly 
inscrutable Belize trust law against production, the court found that the party could 
have better discerned whether the law actually prohibited the production given that 
at least some interpretations of the foreign law appeared not to.437  
2. Hardship to the Other Party 
On the flip side of the hardship calculus is hardship to the other party to the 
litigation. Namely, the hardship that party would face if foreign law is interposed to 
thwart the regular operation of U.S. law that ordinarily would allow the party to 
utilize its procedural rights to vindicate its substantive rights. Here due process is 
both a shield and a sword. It potentially shields the party trapped in the absolute 
conflict from the full extent of the hardship the absolute conflict imposes. But it also 
                                                                                                                 
 
 432. Weiss v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, PLC, 242 F.R.D. 33, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) 
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 435. SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 436. Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 437. Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 538, 548 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
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lops off portions of that shield if they place too high a burden on the party seeking to 
vindicate its own rights in U.S. courts—sometimes to the detriment of the party stuck 
in the absolute conflict. Thus in Rogers, we saw due process shield the petitioner 
from summary dismissal but also potentially cut off petitioner’s ability to mount 
certain types of defenses at trial.438 The case law and the Restatement articulate three 
related considerations in mixed and procedural absolute conflict scenarios for 
measuring whether to pierce the protective shield in favor of disclosure: the relevance 
of the requested material to the litigation, the specificity of the request, and the 
availability of alternative means of obtaining the requested material.439 
As to the relevance of the requested material, the cases appear to demand a higher 
threshold than that contemplated by ordinary discovery rules440—or as one court put 
it, “more than merely relevant under the broad test generally for evaluating discovery 
requests.”441 Courts view information that is “vital,”442 “crucial,”443 and 
“essential”444 to the litigation as weighing in favor of the party seeking discovery. 
What this means in the actual litigation context is that “the outcome of litigation . . . 
‘stand[s] or fall[s] on the present discovery order,’”445 or, at the very least, that the 
information is “highly relevant . . . to the claims and defenses” in the case.446 Courts 
have also found such a requirement attractive because it obviates “civil law 
countries’ traditional concerns with pretrial fishing expeditions.”447 On the other 
hand, courts have been concerned that refusing discovery in such situations could 
inflict real hardship on parties seeking to right legal wrongs against them. According 
to the court in Stanford, a case that alleged massive transnational Ponzi schemes, 
refusing access to overseas records where the illicit profits were stored could have 
meant that “[i]n the end, the greatest hardship would fall to the Ponzi schemes’ 
victims, who may be able to recover only pennies on the dollar.”448  
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The other two considerations are somewhat more straightforward and also both 
resemble and tend to heighten the requirements of ordinary discovery rules. As to 
specificity, the law imposes an obligation on the party seeking discovery in absolute 
conflict cases to make requests “reasonably tailored to the circumstances of th[e] 
case.”449 And, just as courts “must limit . . . discovery” that is “unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive”450 under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, in absolute conflicts cases “[i]f the information sought can easily be 
obtained elsewhere, there is little or no reason to require a party to violate foreign 
law.”451 On the other hand, if “[t]here is no alternative source”452 for the information, 
courts are more inclined to compel discovery. 
In short, hardship is a two-way street. The cases show that courts are attuned not 
only to hardships imposed on parties subject to absolute conflicts but also to 
hardships imposed on other parties to the litigation because they may be deprived of 
the procedural and substantive legal benefits they ordinarily would enjoy absent the 
absolute conflict. 
As with any fairness analysis, good faith and hardship show that there can be 
factors, sub-factors, and even sub-sub-factors—some of which may be present and 
some of which may not, depending on the case. At what point certain facts transform 
into a doctrinal “factor” for a court’s legal analysis is a difficult question, and one I 
don’t pretend to fully answer here. The cases are sufficiently diverse and scattered 
across fields that even culling the considerations courts use in their decision making 
is hard. The deeper one digs into the facts of each case, the more one finds aspects 
that may have swayed a court’s decision. And yet, there are commonalities and 
themes. My hope in this Part is to have articulated and communicated these themes 
and the factors they hinge upon clearly enough to build an initial and useful blueprint 
for discerning fairness in absolute conflicts cases going forward. 
CONCLUSION  
Imagine you are deciding whether to engage in activity that potentially may 
subject you to contradictory legal commands of different jurisdictions. The essential 
question you face—and the essential question this Article has sought to explore and 
answer—is: What kind of methodology would you prefer for determining the law or 
laws that ultimately will apply to your activity? 
On the one hand are prevailing tests that focus heavily if not exclusively on state 
interests. The practical result of these tests is that only after you have acted will you 
have an idea of what law will apply to you based on where the case against you, 
whether criminal or civil, is initiated. And just to be clear, you likely also have no 
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meaningful control over that decision. This type of methodology most often takes 
the form of a crude governmental interest approach that simply counts up state 
interests in a way that almost ineluctably leads to the application of forum law so as 
to trap you in an absolute conflict with foreign law. While these tests may pay lip 
service to your efforts to comply with both laws in good faith and the hardships you 
may face as a result of the absolute conflict, such considerations are often minimized 
to the vanishing point or gobbled up by predatory state interests. 
And the legal and practical fallout is manifest on many levels. Because the forum 
cannot excuse on its own the operation of a foreign sovereign’s laws, these tests 
promise only to increase absolute conflicts of law in a shrinking world in which 
transnational actors are increasingly subject to multiple contradictory regulatory 
regimes. Proliferating absolute conflicts is itself disturbing because they do violence 
to the rule of law by placing human actors in legally impossible situations. For as 
this Article has now argued at length, absolute conflicts are qualitatively different 
from other doctrines like true conflicts because they necessarily make compliance 
with law, broadly conceived, impossible. And as a practical consequence, they also 
promise to chill or even paralyze transnational activity beneficent to overall welfare. 
The time has come to start thinking creatively about how rule of law criteria held 
so dear to the functioning of our domestic legal systems can migrate and adapt to the 
multistate international system. Predicate to this thinking is a willingness to conceive 
of the international system as a system to which the rule of law can and should apply. 
As I have argued, the absence of an overarching top-down lawmaking authority does 
not inevitably deprive the international system of the benefits of the rule of law. It 
does, however, pose new and interesting challenges for legal thinkers intent on 
bringing those benefits to bear.  
This Article has sought to meet that challenge in the absolute conflict context by 
developing an alternative methodology to prevailing tests that asks courts across 
jurisdictions to reorient their analysis around fairness to parties instead of state 
interests. Perhaps most crucial to this fairness analysis is its focus on the parties’ own 
conduct: engaging in activity and seeking to comply with the law in good faith, trying 
affirmatively to avoid antinomies through various means any good lawyer can advise 
on, fair notice, and a willingness to bear both avoidable and unavoidable hardships 
commensurate with benefits received. By placing a degree of control in parties’ 
hands, the law becomes more predictable ex ante, shoring up the system’s stability 
while distancing the absence of law, or anarchy—the antithesis of the rule of law. 
  
